

PSSI PERSPECTIVES — 12

VRBĚTICE: CASE STUDY OF CZECH RESILIENCE AGAINST HOSTILE PROPAGANDA

Authors: Michaela Dvořáková, Jonáš Syrovátka, Prague Security Studies Institute



VRBĚTICE: CASE STUDY OF CZECH RESILIENCE AGAINST HOSTILE PROPAGANDA

Authors: Michaela Dvořáková, Jonáš Syrovátka, Prague Security Studies Institute

On Saturday evening April 17, 2021, the Czech Republic's Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš, and the Minister of the Interior, Jan Hamáček announced, based on findings of the Czech counterintelligence service - the Security and Information Service (SIS), that Russia was involved in the explosion at the Vrbětice ammunition depot in 2014. Agents of the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service, identified as the culprits in the case, were also responsible for the attempted poisoning of the defector Sergei Skripal. The finding that Russian security agencies were not only operating within the Czech territory but also committed violent acts caused great concern among Czech politicians and the general public.

On October 13, 2014, the Czech Republic experienced the first explosion in the Vrbětice ammunition depot. After evacuation of the area and adjacent settlements and careful clearing of unexploded ordnance, the government took extra steps to keep the ammunition depot area secure. However, this attempt was apparently not successful as another explosion occurred only a couple of months later, in December 2014. At that time, the government's initial explanation was that the explosion was caused by an unprofessional handling of the ammunition by workers at the depot, and only later did it rule out the possibility of malicious actors being involved. The second explosion, however, was a much tougher case; the entire area was supposed to be under supervision and, reportedly, the depot had no reason to spontaneously explode. The findings about the involvement of the Russian security agencies explains this mystery.

The new findings about the Vrbětice incident attracted significant attention from the media and became the main topic of public debate. Unsurprisingly, this situation created a fertile ground for the spread of conspiracy theories, hoaxes and speculations, which started to emerge almost immediately after the announcement. Statements questioning Russian involvement have emerged mainly in the familiar eco-system of websites, Facebook groups and Youtube channels known for their conspiratorial thinking and pro-Russian views. This development was accelerated by Russian state representatives and the media trying to discredit claims made by the Czech government. To make matters worse, cracks also started to appear among Czech government representatives, as some of them (including president Miloš Zeman) questioned the reliability of findings concerning Russian involvement in the Vrbětice explosion. Moreover, the Czech news site Seznam Zprávy claimed that minister Hamáček's planned visit to Moscow, which should have occurred just a week after the announcement, was not a cover-up coordinated with Czech secret services (as he claimed), but an attempt to negotiate the supply of Sputnik V vaccines in exchange for the hushing up of the whole incident. At this point, it is hard to judge whether this claim is true or not, but it contributed to the confusion.

Although Czech official communication – as will be later described in detail – overall turned out to be a failure, there were definitely some achievements in this regard. Most notably, there was a significant reduction in the staff size of the Russian Embassy, which was repeatedly marked as a hub of espionage in Central

Europe. In terms of political decisions, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jakub Kulhánek, conducted the following step – 18 workers at the Russian embassy in Prague were obliged to leave the Czech Republic. Russia responded by removing 20 Czech embassy workers from their posts in the Czech embassy in Moscow. The Minister, in reaction to this, [called](#) for diplomatic parity between Russia and the Czech Republic.

These actions, passed back and forth between representatives of Russia and the Czech Republic, triggered a chain reaction and soon other states of the European Union, in solidarity with the Czech Republic, started removing Russian embassy workers too. Unfortunately, the reaction of the EU member states and Great Britain was not as strong as the Czech Republic would have hoped for – only five countries ordered the expulsion of Russian diplomats. But this cannot be blamed solely on the EU – it was clear that the Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš did little to [coordinate](#) the actions with Czech allies in this matter. Another significant blow to Russian interests in the Czech Republic was the decision to [exclude](#) the Russian company Rosatom from preparing a tender for the construction of new blocks in the Dukovany nuclear power plant. This decision can be revoked by the next government, but it would be quite difficult due to the long shadows that Vrbětice will have on relations between these countries. Russia also [retaliated](#) and put the Czech Republic on a newly-created “list of enemy countries”, which currently has only one other state – the United States of America.

For Czech citizens, it was not possible to avoid the topic, since the Vrbětice incident became the main subject of heated public debate for at least the rest of April. Despite confused government communication, the official version convinced at least part of the population. According to an [opinion poll](#) conducted at the end of May, roughly half of the respondents trusted the government and believed that Russia and the GRU were behind the Vrbětice ammunition depot explosions. On the other hand, the official version of the incident was questioned by 20% of respondents and the rest had no opinion about the matter.

The text aims to take a closer look at a particular feature of the Vrbětice incident, which is the emerging narratives questioning the Russian involvement and their impact on the Czech population. To obtain data on these narratives, we used a media monitoring tool, Pulsar Media Monitor, provided to us by the Beacon Project of the International Republican Institute. The capability of this tool to map websites, Twitter and Facebook pages allowed us to put fringe narratives into the broader context of the dynamic in the Czech information space. We focused on the period immediately after the incident, when the topic resonated most strongly in the public discourse – specifically during two weeks from 14-30 April, 2021.

The first part of the text focuses on the hostile propaganda narratives questioning Russian involvement in the Vrbětice incident and undermining the official version of the incident and maps their proliferation, mainly in the ecosystem of conspiracy websites. The second part puts them in the broader context of the dynamic of the Czech media space. In the final part, we will take a look at government communication in relation to the incident and its successes and shortcomings.

HOSTILE PROPAGANDA RELATED TO VRBĚTICE INCIDENT


To understand the spread of hostile propaganda within the Czech information space, it is important to understand the actors behind it. Its main sources – websites, Facebook pages and Youtube channels – are located on the fringes of the Czech information space and created an interlinked ecosystem promoting alternative views, not only in politics but also in lifestyle or religion. The [modus operandi](#) and [motivations](#)

of individual actors differ, but they are united in the narratives denigrating Western liberalism, promoting conspiratorial thinking, and praising Russia. At this point, it was not proven that these sources are directly managed by Russian entities, but it is obvious that they are serving as a bridge bringing Russian narratives into the Czech information space. For example, while reporting about the COVID-19 pandemic, the notorious conspiracy website AC24 [republished](#) 39% of its content from Russian state-owned news site Sputnik CZ.

The reach of conspiracy websites or pro-Russian hostile propaganda is hard to assess. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Endowment Fund of Independent Journalism in 2021, more than 66% of respondents [encountered](#) news they considered to be disinformation. The Globsec Trends 2021 [shows](#) that around 24% of respondents believed in tested conspiracy theories related to the coronavirus. The opinion poll conducted by STEM in 2020 [revealed](#) that 5% of the population actively spreads news they consider to be kept secret by mainstream media and 10% actively seeks it out on the internet. Based on these findings, it is possible to concur with researcher Josef Šlérka from the Endowment Fund of Independent Journalism that there are between 12-16 % of hardcore conspiracy theory believers in the Czech society. This is the audience that was the most likely to be susceptible to hostile propaganda questioning the official version of the Vrbětice incident.

This hostile propaganda clearly manifested itself in the Czech information space immediately after the public announcement of the incident. As the graph below shows, various theories about the Vrbětice incident (highlighted in black) immediately [became](#) the centerpiece of prominent conspiracy websites and replaced COVID-19 (highlighted in green), which was the main topic of previous months. The swiftness and nature of reaction led some experts to the [assumption](#) that the Czech Republic faced a coordinated campaign similar to this in the aftermath of the Salisbury poisoning and the downing of the Malaysian airliner MH17. This claim is of course difficult to prove, but it is without doubt that the Czech conspiracy ecosystem is very flexible in its topical focus, able to adapt to changing circumstances and introduce pro-Russian narratives to the Czech information space.

Ruská propaganda a dezinformace v českých online médiích v dubnu 2021



Source: Czech Elves

The narratives appearing in the hostile propaganda were multiple and evolved rapidly over time. Their overarching topic was the questioning of the official version presented by the Czech government. It was, for example, pointed out that the emergence of the evidence seven years after the incident is suspicious, the evidence is not sufficient, and the whole story was fabricated to discredit Russia and stop the discussion about the purchasing of the Sputnik V vaccine or to exclude Rosatom from the tender for the new nuclear power plant. Articles circulating in the conspiracy ecosystem also [questioned](#) the reliability of the Czech intelligence services, which were to be in charge of the whole provocation, in fact organized by the CIA to promote the interests of the United States. The conspiracy theory according to which the incident was to serve as a cover for the attempted assassination of the Belorussian dictator Alexander Lukashenko, which gained international traction, also [appeared](#), but remains only one of many alternative explanations of the whole incident.

The confusion created by conspiracy theories was further exacerbated by speculations articulated by various politicians, which further undermined the unanimity of the official position. The most prominent example was president Zeman, who waited with his official statement the entire week after the incident. This strategy allowed him to attract the attention of the media and shape further the discussion about the incident. Zeman used this opportunity to further undermine the official version by pointing out the ongoing investigation and existence of two possible scenarios of the incident. According to the alleged second version, the explosion was caused by the unprofessional handling of explosive material in the depot. The Minister of Interior Hamáček later [stated](#) that this claim is false and investigators operate only with one version, which identifies Russian security services as perpetrators. However, the damage was already done, and Zeman's words led to a new surge of articles about Vrbětice in the conspiracy ecosystem (as visible from the graph above after April 25).


The speculation about numerous versions of the incident did not stop. Only a few days later Minister of Justice, Marie Benešová, [agreed](#) with the president and claimed that there are more than two versions under investigation. This constant questioning of the official version further undermined its credibility and created space for confusion and the spread of hostile propaganda. Equally problematic was the claim by the Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš, who [stated](#) that the explosion was “not a terrorist attack, but merely an attack on goods”. Despite the fact that this statement referred to a broader and legitimate terminological debate led at the time by the security experts, in the given context it was problematic as it created the ground for questioning the seriousness of the whole incident and the legitimacy of consequent actions taken by the Czech government.

The presented examples demonstrate that the hostile propaganda related to the Vrbětice incident could not only rely on the existing infrastructure of conspiracy channels but also thrived thanks to unclear or completely misleading statements of the Czech public officials. Whether this situation enabled its proliferation to the mainstream media space is the subject of the next chapter.

HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND MAINSTREAM MEDIA

The forceful and consistent attempts of the conspiracy websites to promote hostile propaganda are crucial to interpret within the overall context of the Czech information landscape. The analysis presented in this chapter do so by mapping the coverage of the Vrbětice incident by the mainstream media.¹ The use of the Pulsar Media Monitor allowed us to measure the intensity of coverage and identify its main actors. This quantitative assessment is accompanied by the content analysis of the twelve most-viewed articles related to the Vrbětice incident. Based on this analysis, it will be possible to assess the ability of the platforms to spread conspiracy theories to disseminate hostile propaganda into the Czech information space.

The media started to pay significant attention to the Vrbětice incident immediately after the public announcement. As shown on the graph below their interest peaked on Tuesday April 20 (1023 mentions of the incident were identified by Pulsar), but it remained significant for the whole week. The second, smaller peak occurred on April 25 after the speech given by president Zeman (471 mentions of the incident were identified by Pulsar). This proves the ability of the president to shape the public debate. While comparing these data with the graph by Czech Elves above it is possible to see a similar dynamic. Hence, it is possible to conclude that despite the fact that the conspiracy ecosystem represents a distinct part of the information space, it is still closely attached to it and – especially when it comes to significant events – it has the same dynamic. These findings reaffirm the authors’ ambition to research these two subjects together, since separate research does not allow their full understanding.



Source: PSSI

While analyzing who shaped the debate about the Vrbětice incident, it is important to keep in mind two interlinked variables. First, the intensity of coverage allows us to assess the level of interest of a given media outlet, and secondly its reach shows how much it is able to shape public perceptions. In relation to Vrbětice, the most articles were published at *Parlamentní listy* (600), *iDnes.cz* (547), *Právě Dnes* (333), *České noviny*

¹ The combination of key words was Vrbětice AND sklad OR výbuch OR útok OR BIS OR Rusko OR GRU.

(317) and Lidovky.cz (270).² These outlets are very different, since iDnes.cz and Lidovky.cz belong to the Czech media mainstream, České noviny are the official portal of the public news provider Czech News Agency, and Právě Dnes is a news aggregator. The most interesting case from the point of view of hostile propaganda is Parlamentní listy, which is known for its low level of editorial culture, providing a space to extremist voices and **republishing** the content of Russian state-owned outlet Sputnik CZ. Therefore, it is possible to say that this outlet **represents** a bridge between mainstream media and the ecosystem of conspiracy websites. Needless to say, the volume of articles published by the websites is quite high in general.

The disparity between the number of articles and their impact can be illustrated by looking at the visibility of each website calculated by Pulsar.³ Parlamentní listy continues to be a relevant player with a total visibility of 814 698 views. However, this situation seems to be caused mainly by the overall volume of the articles, since the average visibility is 1 358 views per article. Similar story is iDnes.cz, which acquired the highest visibility also due to the overall high number of articles (average visibility is 2 320 views per article). On the contrary, the news site ČT24 (average visibility is 3 964 views per article), the website of the Czech Television, and Novinky.cz (average visibility is 3 302 views per article) significantly outperformed. To develop this observation further, it is also important to take into consideration people's perception of the outlet, which is likely to influence the attitudes towards coverage they produce. While mainstream media are perceived by the majority of respondents as a reliable source of information (with Czech Broadcast, Czech Television and Czech News Agency as leading outlets), the perception of Parlamentní listy is more complex. The number of respondents who were **perceived** as unreliable (20%) was even higher than those who trusted them (16.7%). This indicates the limited ability of this outlet to shape public debate. On the contrary, public media remains the key actor shaping the Czech debate about the Vrbětice incident due to their high reach and reliability.

News outlet	Number of articles related to Vrbětice	Total visibility	Average visibility per article	Level of trust ⁴
Parlamentní listy	600	814 698	1 358	16,7%
iDnes.cz	547	1 268 951	2 320	37,5%
Právě dnes	333	42 977	129	N/A
České noviny	317	151 082	477	N/A
Lidovky	270	216 916	803	30,9%
Novinky	158	521 652	3 302	31,8%
Blesk	157	135 929	866	7%
ČT 24	147	582 733	3 964	56,6%
Echo24	140	23 271	166	N/A
iRozhlas	134	280 869	2 096	56,8%

² The dynamic of the Czech Facebook is deliberately omitted from the analysis since this complex topic would require separate study using also different tools than Pulsar to provide reliable comparison.

³ Pulsar tool **counts** visibility according to the type of the post, medium, size of its audience and average engagement.

⁴ According to the Masaryk University **research** conducted between December 2019 and February 2020 (combination of answers “Reliable” and “Rather reliable”)

A similar picture appears while taking a closer look at the 12 most popular articles related to the Vrbětice incident published in the analysed period (see Appendix). Ten of them were published by mainstream media such as Czech Television, Novinky.cz and TV Nova. A popular article from the Czech Public Broadcast even directly challenged hostile propaganda while debunking inaccuracies in the speech made by president Zeman. Parlamentní listy published two of the most popular articles, but it is worth pointing out that neither of them was original; they instead recycled information that already appeared on other platforms. The first case was the debate on Prima CNN News, where security expert Andor Šándor expressed doubt about the official version (needless to say that his opponent advocating for the official version was also quoted), and the second case quoted popular priest Tomáš Halík, who actually criticized president Zeman for promoting Russian interests. Hence even this medium that might be the source of conspiracy theories related to the Vrbětice incident in its most popular articles partly tackled the hostile propaganda narratives. Whether its readers took these specific messages from articles with snappy headlines appealing to emotions is another matter. In the online survey on the website 94% out of allegedly 36 thousand respondents claim that Russia does not present a threat to the Czech Republic. But it is an open question whether they did not hold this opinion already before reading the articles or prior to the whole incident. However, the complexity of the case of Parlamentní listy highlights the need for nuanced analysis of individual actors of the information space to acquire a better understanding of the dynamic of hostile propaganda.

Another example illustrating the necessity of nuanced analysis of the information space is the fact that the most prominent article parroting hostile propaganda narratives was published on the mainstream website Novinky.cz. The article quoted the statement of the Czech ex-president Václav Klaus, who saw the Vrbětice incident as another artificially manufactured attempt to manipulate the population after “covid hysteria”. Aside from these statements, the article summarized other statements questioning the official version. Arguably this one-sided reporting in the mainstream represents the most significant challenge to the government communication compared to conspiracy websites operating on the fringes of the information space. The way in which political representatives and state institutions tried to address it is described in the following chapter.

STATE COMMUNICATION DURING THE VRBĚTICE INCIDENT

As was mentioned above, the first announcement related to the Vrbětice incident occurred completely unexpectedly (even for other elected representatives), and at the worst possible time of Saturday evening. According to some speculations, government representatives were forced to make this move as the media reportedly had information about the Russian involvement in the explosion and were ready to publish it. If this is the case, it points out not only to the inability of the government institutions to protect such sensitive information, but also to the low trust between media and political representation, who should coordinate in such unprecedented cases. Experts saw the consequent communication of the government as “messy”, and spoke about the missed opportunity. The confusion was exacerbated by inconsistent comments from state officials, misinterpretation produced by the president, and the heated rhetoric of the opposition, who saw this situation as an opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with the government before the planned vote of no confidence. The consequent speculation about the alleged plan of the Minister of Interior Hamáček to trade information about Vrbětice for the supply of Russian vaccines further clouded the situation.

This situation contributed to the fact that the Czech diplomacy was not able to achieve a coordinated expulsion of Russian diplomats with the allies, as Great Britain did after the attack in Salisbury in 2018. To illustrate this inability to articulate its interests to foreign partners, the High Representative of the Union

for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell, [claimed](#) that the Czech Republic did not ask for the coordinated expulsion of diplomats at the consequent meeting of the Ministers of EU countries. Minister Hamáček denied this claim and stated that he pleaded for a coordinated response. Authors cannot assess the reasons behind this misunderstanding, but it clearly shows how the inability to communicate undermines the policy goals of Czech representatives.

When Czech politicians failed to properly communicate and thus opened the door to hostile propaganda, it was up to the government institutions to intervene. The scope of this article does not permit the analysis of every institution that should have been responsible for the reaction to the Vrbětice incident, but it takes a look at one particular actor – the Centre against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (CTHH). This unit was established at the Ministry of Interior in 2017, and among its responsibilities is to debunk disinformation that is related to its portfolio. In the case of the Vrbětice incident, CTHH played this role and published information about the tactic used by hostile propaganda, a summary of the most commonly prominent narratives (also in English), and supported the communication of other institutions by re-posting their statements on its main communication platform – [Twitter account](#). The popularity of posts related to the Vrbětice incident outperformed the average level of engagement on this account (the most popular [post](#) dedicated to Russian information operations from April 19 got 374 likes and 85 retweets). The CTHH's posts were also [quoted](#) in at least two articles dedicated to examples of hostile propaganda. This example suggested that Czech Republic already has certain capabilities in place to tackle hostile propaganda by debunking, informing and supporting its strategic communications.

However, what is still lacking is the culture that would bring all existing components – government institutions, politicians and media – together and allow them to craft a unified narrative. The mentioned sociological survey shows that this is very much needed as 35% of respondents claimed that they do not actually know what happened in the Vrbětice munition depot. This situation shows that the government is still struggling to effectively convey its message to a significant part of the population.

CONCLUSION

Crisis situations, such as the revelation of the true nature of the Vrbětice incident, represent a potent research opportunity in providing a unique look into the behavior of various actors in the information space and improving our understanding of their nature. This article analyzed the behavior of notorious conspiracy spreaders, their ability to shape the public debate and the response of government institutions.

The research, as in the past, demonstrated that on the fringe of the Czech information space there is a developed and interlinked system of platforms which promote pro-Russian agenda. It also illustrated that this space is able to quickly mobilize and react to ongoing crisis situations. Therefore, it is necessary to closely observe it and look for ways to disrupt it, for instance by limiting the revenues from advertising for entities operating these platforms, reduce their access to social media in case they will breach community standards, or take legal action if they break the law. This continuous effort may decrease the ability of hostile propaganda to disseminate in the Czech information space.

However, it should be pointed out that the impact of these platforms on the overall debate is very limited and the key role is played by mainstream media – especially the public ones who are also trusted. To keep them independent and providing quality journalism is essential for the resilience of the Czech information space towards hostile propaganda. The case of *Parlamentní listy* remains particularly relevant as it continues to serve as a bridge between conspiracy websites and mainstream media while this is recognized

by a significant part of the population, which undermines its ability to shape the public debate. The general lesson for the media is to provide quality, factual and unbiased reporting because by doing so they not only keep the trust of their readers but also contribute to limiting the spread of hostile propaganda, which can sneak into the media mainstream as the product of sloppy or sensationalist journalism.

The communication crisis around the Vrbětice incident illustrated that the Czech government lacks the capability to communicate clearly and consistently, partially due to the lack of coordination and trust among various actors who should, in such an exceptional case, cooperate despite political or institutional differences. In this context, existing infrastructure – such as CTHH – is able to achieve only tactical successes, which provide limited benefits to the system as a whole. Therefore, the continuing effort on improving strategic communication is the key lesson that the Czech government should take from the Vrbětice incident. This is particularly important as this ability will be probably soon tested due to another worsening of the coronavirus pandemic in relation to new variants of the virus and limited willingness of population to get vaccinated.

The data-gathering tool Pulsar Media Monitor was provided by the [Beacon Project](#) of the International Republic Institute.

The project was supported by the [Open Information Partnership](#).

APPENDIX

List of the most visible articles

Byl to útok na zboží, ne akt státního terorismu, prohlásil Babiš k Vrběticím,

released 19/04/2021, total visibility: 10 535

<https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/byl-to-utok-na-zbozi-ne-akt-statniho-terorismu-prohlasil-babis-k-vrbeticim-40357538>

Klaus: Vrběťice jsou vykonstruovaný strašák,

released 19/04/2021, total visibility: 10 107

<https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/klaus-vrbetice-jsou-vykonstruovany-strasak-40357465>

Rusko potvrdilo paritu diplomatů. Omezení technických pracovníků je komplikace, připouští česká diplomacie,

released 23/04/2021, total visibility: 9 973

<https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/specialy/cesko-ruska-krize/3301853-pobaltske-staty-vyhosti-v-solidarite-s-ceskem-ctyri-ruske>

Většina Čechů vnímá Rusko jako hrozbu, ukázal průzkum,

released 22/04/2021 total visibility: 9 960

<https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/vetsina-cechu-vnima-rusko-jako-hrozbu-ukazal-pruzkum-40357849>

Česká republika je pro Rusko nepřátelskou zemí. Kreml ji zapsal na seznam vedle USA či Ukrajiny,

released 28/04/2021, total visibility: 8 984

<https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/svet/3303981-ceska-republika-je-pro-rusko-nepratelskou-zemi-kreml-ji-zapsal-na-seznam-vedle-usa-ci>

Putovní dvojice ruských agentů? Tu spáchají výbuch, tu útok novičokem? Generál Šándor jen kroutil hlavou,

released 18/04/2021, total visibility: 8 555

<https://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/monitor/Putovni-dvojice-ruskych-agentu-Tu-spachaji-vybuch-tu-utok-novicokem-General-Sandor-jen-kroutil-hlavou-661030>

Český velvyslanec u NATO požádá i o koordinované vyhoštění diplomatů,

released 19/04/2021, total visibility: 8 539

<https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/svet/3299815-zive-hamacek-informoval-partnery-v-eu-o-kauze-ruskeho-zapojeni-do-vybuchu-ve-vrbeticich>

Slovensko vyhostí tři ruské diplomaty. Moskva dle Reuters odpoví stejným počtem,

released 22/04/2021, total visibility: 8 351

<https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/svet/3301645-slovensko-vyhosti-tri-pracovniky-ruskeho-velvyslanectvi>

Velezrada, rozsvítil se nápis na Hradě. Zeman je agent, tvrdí organizace,

released 20/04/2021, total visibility: 8 196

https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/zastavme-velezradu-prazsky-hrad-zeman-prezident-napis-protest.A210420_075202_domaci_klf

Tomáš Halík: Za Vrběťice může Zeman,

released 22/04/2021, total visibility: 8 091

<https://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/monitor/Tomas-Halik-Za-Vrbetice-muze-Zeman-661531>

Sedm nepřesností Miloše Zemana. Fakta usvědčují prezidenta z nepravdivých tvrzení,

released 25/04/2021, total visibility: 8 084

https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/milos-zeman-projev-tv-prima-ustava-policie-vrbetice_2104251923_vis

Firma, která měla sklad ve Vrběticích:

Překvapivé zjištění, Rusy tam neviděli,

released 19/04/2021, total visibility: 8 003

<https://tn.nova.cz/clanek/rusove-ve-vrbeticich-udajne-nebyli-vybuchy-nesouvisi-mini-pravnik.html>