

NATO AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

A MISSION TO RENEW NATO?

by

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SUMMARY

The key challenge for NATO in the 1990s was whether to accept the call for “out of area” missions. Since Bosnia and Kosovo this has been no longer a question. After 9/11/2001, the main question remains whether - in the context of fighting international terrorism - NATO should “go global”, and if so, what should be the rationale, the scope and the goal of such a mission.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that there exist powerful rational arguments for a **mission of NATO in the Greater Middle East**¹. At the very least, the idea deserves an honest and thorough discussion among the Allies.

The main rationale for NATO’s engagement in the Greater Middle East lies in the very nature of threats emanating from the region – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), poor or irresponsible governance (failed or rogue states), often with virulent anti-American and anti-western rhetoric as the sole coherent policy, as well as local conflicts with global repercussions. Allies should take up the gauntlet and make an effort to design not only a common strategy but also to agree on joint measures within NATO itself. A failure of the U.S. and Europe to face up to these challenges would be detrimental to security on both sides of the Atlantic.

The following seem to be the possible scenarios and their consequences:

1. *Both for the U.S and the EU, it is a policy option **to bypass NATO**² in pursuing their security goals. However, it would be equal to giving up on the political potential of the Alliance. Therefore it is the least desired option, especially for new NATO members since it would devalue their hard won membership, and consequently relegate NATO into oblivion.*
2. *To turn NATO into a common **toolbox**³ that is to be used either by the U.S. – in building coalitions of the willing - or by the EU - in providing muscles for CESDP ambitions – seems to be a tempting “middle-of-the-way“ option for some. However it would put a constant pressure on NATO’s cohesion⁴. Sooner rather than later, we might find that many of the tools in the box are broken, or even worse, that the toolbox is empty.*
3. *If enough political will is present, NATO could serve as a proven framework for building a coherent strategy and providing joint or at least common capabilities. In this case, NATO would maintain an independent ability to project power in order to protect the interests of its members in **NATO-led “out of area” operations**. We tend to view this*

option as an imperative task for the Alliance. However, we could be risking possible overstretch⁵.

At this moment, there prevail obviously different policy approaches on the two sides of the Atlantic: the U.S. tends to rely on ad-hoc coalitions (or multilateralism *à la carte*) rather than on the Alliance, whereas some Europeans view this as unbounded U.S. unilateralism that should be countered. It is NATO that can bridge this potential trans-Atlantic rift – the U.S. should perceive NATO as a formalized ‘coalition of the willing’ and Europeans should use NATO as a primary multilateral venue for cooperation with the U.S. It seems to be clear that using NATO is advantageous both for the U.S.⁶ and European⁷ NATO members.

INTRODUCTION – NATO AFTER IRAQ

The fact that the Iraqi operation was conducted by a ‘coalition of the willing’, outside of NATO structures, is often interpreted as a failure of NATO⁸. Others, e.g. Richard Lugar, vehemently oppose this view.⁹

NATO Secretary General Robertson has recently addressed the key question¹⁰ – why should NATO be involved in stabilizing Iraq? Other analysts¹¹ have concluded that Iraq created another political challenge for NATO members. As a matter of fact, difficulties in post-war management in Iraq have led the U.S. to seek broader support materialized in military contributions¹² and providing greater political legitimacy¹³. In principle, few U.S. policy-makers would like to see the U.S. as a lonely global policeman¹⁴ supported by various ad-hoc coalitions.

So far, the role of NATO in Iraq has been limited¹⁵. NATO’s involvement in postwar Iraq extends only to provide logistical support to the Polish-led division of the multinational stabilization force. Nevertheless, NATO has been always dealing with current principal threats, as has been recently manifested in its takeover of peace operations in Afghanistan. It is no wonder that a discussion about the future of NATO’s role in Iraq and the Greater Middle East is looming¹⁶.

NATO IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST – KEY QUESTIONS

This paper addresses the topic from the following angles: the nature of new security threats, NATO’s capacity to cope with them, the “out of area” concept and its geographical and resource limitations, the possible role for NATO in Iraq or in the Middle East peace process based on NATO’s niche capabilities, potential political implications of NATO’s Middle Eastern engagement, and, finally, the possible “democratizing” effect of NATO’s involvement.

1. TERRITORIAL CORRELATIONS / CONTEXT OF NEW SECURITY THREATS – TERRORISM, PROLIFERATION, FAILED AND ROGUE STATES

The end of the Cold War changed the very substance of European security. Territorial defense against a massive military conflagration in Europe ceased to be the main concern of the Alliance. Wars in the Balkans and accelerated trends toward autonomous European security capabilities forced a drastic change in the security policies of NATO.

After Kosovo new threats emerged into prominence. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, concern about failed or rogue states (non-cooperating states or states of concern, non-state actors, etc.) – these threats seem to dominate any post 9/11 analysis of the international security environment. As a consequence, the geopolitical focus moved beyond Europe¹⁷, or at least to its periphery. The emphasis has shifted from Article V of

the Washington Treaty towards dealing with non-traditional threats¹⁸. Inevitably, this has raised concerns of some NATO members – both old¹⁹ and new – fearing that the exclusive club is losing its prestige by diluting its commitments²⁰.

The Greater Middle East²¹ (GME) seems to be a conundrum of the above-mentioned threats in the potentially most explosive combination²². Moreover, GME is the region where both America and Europe share fundamental interests²³, although – due to various differences - they do not necessarily agree on the policies to pursue these interests. However, there is a powerful incentive to come to an agreement since “neither the U.S. nor Europe can fix the Greater Middle East by itself”.²⁴ In any case, “NATO’s ability to deal with new threats faces an early test in the Middle East”.²⁵

2. HOW CAN NATO REACT? WHAT CAN THE ENLARGED NATO OFFER IN DEALING WITH NEW SECURITY THREATS?

The concept of collective defense (Art. V) has not outlived its relevance. Solidarity among liberal democratic states in defending common values and interests remains vital for the future of democracy. NATO has to maintain its core functions even as it is advancing new ones²⁶. The nature of the new threats deserves an appropriate response: “To combat transnational terrorist networks effectively, NATO should more closely resemble a network itself.”²⁷

The conceptual answer to the new challenges is territorial enlargement, although that has been motivated also by other factors, and functional extension²⁸ or expansion²⁹. Any future enlargement of NATO remains geographically confined to the Euro-Atlantic area. However, if NATO is to assume a global role, it cannot do so without closely cooperating with non-European allies (e.g. Australia). In principle, NATO should keep the door open to all eligible allies³⁰ (e.g. Israel). Any functional expansion requires intra-alliance consensus – the current position of NATO is reflected in the Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999.

2.1 THE SHIFT FROM MILITARY TO NON-MILITARY ROLES (‘NATION BUILDING’)

The new security environment is often characterized by the growing relevance of non-military³¹ and non-state factors. Some analysts argue that NATO and EU should divide labor as if the non-military tasks were solely EU business³², whereas others think that NATO is also capable of nation building tasks³³. NATO’s contribution to the democratic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as to similar transitions in some of the older member states - e.g. in cultivating civilian control of armed forces – cannot be denied. This might be of utmost importance in societies where the military serves as a backbone.

The question arises whether EU is better equipped for the so-called soft security tasks or whether it is simply making a virtue of its inability to deal with the hard ones. It is unclear why European

NATO members should be ready to offer more capabilities under the EU flag than they are offering as a part of the Alliance.

In this context, it is important to argue that NATO rather than the U.S. – EU format should remain the main framework of transatlantic security cooperation. It is obvious that NATO provided the necessary political element in containing the Soviet military threat. Coping with the current threats again requires the kind of political legitimacy that can best be secured through NATO.

On a deeper level, it could be argued that NATO - as the traditional repository and defender of “western” values: liberal democracy, free market, rule of law - should be the appropriate vehicle for responding to the new non-traditional threats since they seem to be targeted against this very body of values rather than against any single country, specific territory or specific policy.

3. IS NATO’S “OUT OF AREA” CONCEPT APPLICABLE IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST?

The main question considered during the 90s was whether NATO had to expand and accept new missions beyond defending its own territory. As Richard Lugar argued in the early 1990s “*NATO has to go out of area, or out of business.*” However, NATO strategic and conceptual documents (Rome Declaration of 1991 or Madrid Declaration of 1997) kept referring to European or trans-Atlantic security. The Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999 reflected the growing awareness of the changed global security environment.³⁴ Terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 showed how urgent the question about the place of NATO in the global security system really was.

3.1 SHOULD NATO ‘GO GLOBAL’?

No consensus on this question has been achieved³⁵. The debate about the global role for NATO has on the one hand revealed a growing awareness of global challenges,³⁶ inhibited on the other hand by fears of overextending NATO’s obligations³⁷. Talbott³⁸ and Kugler³⁹ tried to formulate a balanced view by rejecting global ambitions of NATO. In recent years, opinions among NATO members have shifted significantly: even NATO’s Secretary General suggested that the once unthinkable is no longer taboo⁴⁰. After 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq, one may witness a new dynamism of this debate and some go even further by calling unreservedly for a global NATO⁴¹.

3.2 THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AS A KEY GLOBAL CHALLENGE?

As we mentioned earlier, the Greater Middle East is the most prominent source of mutually correlated threats at the intersection of vital interests. Not incidentally, the region is denoted as the Rubik Cube⁴². Emerson & Tocci identified four main interrelated crises in the GME – the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, threats of Al-Qaeda, the crisis over Iraq and the overall development of the region, or rather the lack thereof. However, due to their preferences for the UN, the US and the EU engagement, the authors have assumed only a minor role for NATO in the region. Others suggest that any engagement of former European colonial powers in the region may raise old fears and resentments⁴³.

3.2.1 NATO AND ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been traditionally viewed as the very source of Middle Eastern instability. In the past, one might come to the conclusion that without solving this conflict one cannot envisage stability in the Middle East. At the same time, before the occupation of Iraq one could not realistically expect a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (many Israelis still think that that conflict management is the best possible outcome). Rolling back Iraq changed the strategic map of the whole Middle East and paved the way for the Road Map – a new attempt to move the Israeli-Palestinian track forward. In fact, the Pandora box of GME has been opened in a different way than expected.

The truth is that without international engagement the Israeli-Palestinian relations are likely to deteriorate even further⁴⁴. The idea of international monitoring of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement is supported from various policy perspectives:

- *NATO peacekeeping role after the settlement*⁴⁵
- *UN or NATO presence as crisis management*⁴⁶
- *U.S.-led trusteeship*⁴⁷

Any international presence would be highly sensitive for Israel and it is perceived with caution in Washington, too. On the other hand, Palestinians consistently call for international involvement as a counterweight to Israel. So far, Europeans have preferred to be involved as the EU in the Quartet format (US, EU, Russia, UN) rather than going through NATO. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that at a certain stage of future settlement NATO – alone or in concert with others - might contribute politically rather than militarily on the ground.

There is also a defensive rationale for channeling any western involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through NATO. A dual-track (US, EU) or a multiple-track (US, EU, UN, and Russia) approach might in the course of time transform the so far differing perspectives into conflicting ones, with disastrous consequences both for the Atlantic cohesion and for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself.

3.2.2 NATO AND THE GULF – IRAQ

The Persian Gulf is of primary concern to NATO allies because of two reasons: proliferation of WMD and securing energy supplies⁴⁸. It seems that Americans are more aware of the coincidence of NATO member countries' interests in the Gulf and see more European engagement as desirable⁴⁹. It is the European reluctance that stands in the way of more allied cooperation in the Gulf⁵⁰. As was shown in the Iraqi case, some Europeans do not subscribe to the U.S. policies in the Gulf. Nevertheless, in the current circumstances the way for NATO to the Gulf leads through Iraq⁵¹.

4. POTENTIAL ROLE FOR NATO AND ITS TOOLS

The key question is whether there are any niche capabilities that neither the EU nor the US alone can provide. What may be the unique contributions of NATO in the GME? Are they primarily in the military or in the political areas⁵²?

NATO can provide political legitimacy to stabilization and democratization in the GME. Nevertheless, there will be always a tendency toward using selective formats (e.g. Quartet, Contact Group, etc).

There is the remarkable military record of NATO in planning and running peacekeeping operations including post-conflict stabilization and reforming security structures⁵³. Suggestions have been made to use this expertise in the GME⁵⁴.

It is a matter of further discussion whether NATO is capable of providing assistance in nation building and promotion of democracy. Here again, Iraq is a test case.

In 1990s NATO has developed a spectrum of tools to deal with the external challenges it has faced: enlarged cooperation forums (NACC, EAPC), NATO+1 dialogue (NRC, NUC, Mediterranean dialogue), partnership programs (PfP) and even procedures for future membership (MAP). Patterns of dialogue and cooperation, of sharing best practices and standards, and of providing assistance are firmly rooted in the NATO culture. Possible ways of using some of the existing models in the GME region should be considered. NATO should offer a modified PfP program to some of the countries in the region. Whether this may include even a long-term perspective of membership remains to be discussed. The weak point in applying the above-mentioned formats - which were designed for Europe – in the GME is the following: what kind of sufficient incentives – apart from the membership perspective – can NATO offer in reforming the security system in the GME? Security consultations or partnerships not involving full membership do not seem sufficient, especially for some of the smaller democratic or democratizing countries of the region. The problem is that the “added value” of a NATO security

involvement as opposed to a US security guarantee is at the moment not very high. That, however, can and should change in the course of time.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE NATO ENGAGEMENT IN THE GME (IRAQ, PALESTINE) – CEMENTING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS OR DESTROYING NATO’S COHESION?

NATO could obviously neglect global aspirations in its further development. The consequence would be the loss of global significance⁵⁵. All depends on policies of member states. The most poignant expression of this fact comes from the U.S.⁵⁶ If NATO takes up global challenges – initially in the GME region – it would be a serious test of its interoperability and cohesion. It would have inevitable implications for planning⁵⁷ and decision-making procedures⁵⁸ within the Alliance, which present some member states with an undoubtedly sensitive dilemma. Authorization of planning procedures and weakening of the principle of unanimity are definitely explosive subjects for political discussions within NATO. However, the alternatives seem to be even worse. The risk of bypassing or marginalizing NATO is evident. Deepening of the Atlantic rift over NATO would be detrimental to both its shores. There is a way out - the U.S. should perceive NATO as a formalized ‘coalition of the willing’ and Europeans should use NATO as a primary multilateral venue for cooperation with the U.S. Thus NATO will be able to deal with the most urgent current crises starting with the Greater Middle East.

To search for a global role for NATO just so that it has some kind of a role would be both wrong and destined to fail. A freedom-loving alliance, just like a freedom-loving country, should not seek adventures abroad, “*in search of monsters to slay*”⁵⁹. However, in the case of GME, the monsters are already very much there. To address their threats is thus not a question of expanding or transforming NATO’s mission but rather a question of the continued vitality of its original mission and purpose.

ENDNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

¹ By the Greater Middle East we understand the region from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf – sometimes also called „wider Middle East“ = Maghreb + Mashreq + the Gulf – see *Emerson, Michael & Tocci, Nathalie (2003), The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East CEPS, Brussels.*

² “NATO might be sidelined by ad hoc coalitions of states more able and perhaps even more willing than the old NATO fogies.” *Rühle, Michael (2003), NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11, Parameters, Summer 2003, pp. 89-97.*

³ “In extra-European contingencies NATO is **just one** operation framework **among many**...serving as a toolbox (military service center) for extra-European operations...no a priori geographical limits.” *Bertram, Christoph (2002), Paper for Discussion on 15th Review Conference on the Future Task of Alliance, Berlin, September 25, 2002.*

⁴ “The time may have come to look at how a toolbox approach can be reconciled with the continuing need for political cohesion.” *Rühle (ibid.)*

⁵ “NATO may not survive as a general contractor for the pan-Eurasian renovation project.” *Talbott, Strobe (2002): From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk, Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 2002, pp. 46-57.*

⁶ “Should institutions that the United States belongs to—such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—continue to hold a decisive place in U.S. strategy, or should the United States coordinate more with other institutions, such as the European Union (EU), where it has less influence?” Moss, Kenneth B. (2000), *Strategic Choices in the Mediterranean: Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4 No. 1/March 2000*.

⁷ “...by positioning NATO at the hub of European anti-terror efforts, it would provide them /i.e. the Europeans/ with a voice in the planning and implementation of these efforts, as well as bring them in contact with the alliance’s substantial assets and capabilities.” Johnson, Rebecca and Zenko, Micah (2002), *All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should Be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror, in: Parameters, winter 2002-03, pp. 48-63*.

⁸ “...to many commentators and not a few policymakers, the Atlantic Alliance is dead...” Kupchan, Charles (2003), *The Atlantic Alliance Lies in the Rubble, Financial Times, April 10, 2003*.

⁹ “The political rift over Iraq has given ammunition to those who wrongly believe that NATO has outlived its military purpose.” Lugar, Richard (2003), *Nation-Building is a Role for NATO, Financial Times, May 29, 2003*.

¹⁰ “If NATO is the best military framework in the world, can we afford not to use it to help bring stability to post conflict Iraq?” Robertson, George (2003) *The West after Iraq: Are the Security Strategies of the US and Europe still Compatible? BMVG-FAZ Forum Berlin, June 24, 2003*.

¹¹ “The post-Iraqi war era provides an opportunity for NATO to reorient towards the Middle East.” Millen, Raymond A. (2003), *Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: Europe, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), March 2003, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/irqueurop/irqueurop.pdf>*.

¹² “[In Iraq] we want the military burden shared both for military and economic reasons, but also for reasons of political acceptability and legitimacy.” Haass, Richard N. (1998) *Iraq What Next? Containing Saddam is the most likely U.S. policy, The San Diego Union-Tribune, 1 March 1998, available at www.brookings.org*.

¹³ “...giving a role to NATO would prove that Iraq was not a mere American protectorate...” Gordon, Philip H. (2003), *An Alliance for Iraq: A NATO role would heal many hurts, International Herald Tribune, April 15, 2003*.

¹⁴ “...key NATO members other than the U.S. and the UK would have a greater say in the management of Iraq. This could be to the benefit of the United States which has neither the temperament nor the will to be a permanent hegemon in such an inhospitable region of the world.” Kemp, Geoffrey (2003), *Beyond Iraq: Repercussions of Iraq’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Policies, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 12, 2003*.

¹⁵ “...the alliance has no plans for a greater role in postwar Iraq...NATO is already committed in helping in Iraq, we are not at a stage yet of looking at any broader involvement to Iraq.” Robertson (AFP, July, 16, 2003).

¹⁶ “If the U.S. and Britain decide that a broader military presence is required, NATO is the natural choice, as has been the case in Afghanistan.” Kemp (*ibid.*)

¹⁷ “...the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction ... emerge from outside of Europe... they draw US attention away from Europe, ...away from NATO.” Rühle (*ibid.*)

¹⁸ “Make no mistake, modern-day terrorism and WMD proliferation are ‘Article 5 threats’ in NATO’s parlance... the new threats are capable of violating NATO’s borders and striking the societies of all its members as well as their military forces... This trend is rapidly making NATO’s old distinction between Article 4 and Article 5 obsolete. Kugler, Richard (2002), *Preparing NATO to meet new threats: Challenge and Opportunity, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State Vol. 7 No. 1, March 2002*.

¹⁹ “Turkey feared that the recent emphasis on “new missions” in the Strategic Concept could lead to a weakening of Article V and collective defense.” Chubin, Shahram & Green, Jerrold D. & Larrabee, F. Stephen (Rapporteur) (1999), *NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East Center for Middle East Public Policy, Geneva Center for Security Policy*.

²⁰ “The irony of NATO is that is an alliance in search of a purpose, at a time when its biggest member cares less about it, and isn’t quite sure what it gets out of it. Moreover, a growing number of NATO’s members see it mainly as a status club, but one that with each of their joining becomes even less exclusive.” Singer, Peter W. (2003), *New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond, Weltpolitik, January 15, 2003*.

²¹ “Some authors refer to the North Africa, Arabia, Israel and Iran as the Wider Middle East Emerson & Tocci (*ibid.*); others call the same region including Afghanistan and Pakistan the Greater Middle East.” Asmus, Ronald D. and Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002), *The New Transatlantic Project, The Policy Review No.115 October 2002*.

²² “The nature of the new threat we face... the interweaving of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and failed and rogue states from Marrakech to Bangladesh...the challenge we face is de facto concentrated in one specific geographic region — the Greater Middle East. That region starts with Northern Africa and Egypt and Israel at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and extends throughout the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Asmus (*ibid.*)

²³ “In the Middle East, the transatlantic allies share important interests. These include a powerful interest in assuring stable, affordable supplies of energy from the region, and a common stake in the economic and political reforms that are needed to reduce the region’s role as an importer of WMD and an exporter of terror.” *Steinberg, James B. (2003) An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations Survival, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 113–146.*

²⁴ *Asmus (ibid.)*

²⁵ *Talbott (ibid.)*

²⁶ “NATO must find a new balance between addressing its traditional, Euro-centric missions and tackling the new global threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.” *Rühle (ibid.)*

²⁷ *Johnson & Zenko (ibid.)*

²⁸ “The debate over mission has been both functional and geographical.” *Steinberg (ibid.)*

²⁹ “The concept is one of NATO expansion, just in functional rather than geographic terms.” *Singer (ibid.)*

³⁰ According to the Prague Summit Declaration: “NATO’s door will remain open to European democracies...”

³¹ “We need to go on the offensive to address the root causes and not just the symptoms of terrorism... We need to think not only in terms of military preemption but political preemption as well.” *Asmus (ibid.)*

³² “NATO should assume the military burden in Iraq, and a partnership of the US and the European Union should assume the non-military burden... The EU has also demonstrated a capacity to deal with non-military tasks of "nation-building". From every perspective - including the future relevance of NATO and the re forging of links among the world's powers - engaging NATO and the EU in Iraq makes sense...” *Hunter, Robert (2003), America needs Europe to win peace in Iraq, Financial Times July 20, 2003.*

³³ “Successful ‘nation-building’ must be an important objective for US policymakers and their NATO partners.” *Lugar (ibid.)*

³⁴ Article 24 of the Strategic Concept declares: “Any armed attack on the territory of the allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources...” *NATO, Strategic Concept; Approved by NAC, Washington, Apr 23-24, 1999.*

³⁵ Prague Summit Declaration uses rather general wording: “...to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come.”

³⁶ “Should NATO ‘go global’ in its military dimension, to address out-of-area problems that may have an indirect impact on the security of NATO’s members but do not necessarily represent an Article 5 attack on the members’ territory?” *Steinberg (ibid.)*

³⁷ There was no clear consensus within NATO on how far NATO's geographic scope should extend. Most European participants at the workshop felt that NATO should remain focused on Europe and its periphery and argued against any effort to develop a “global NATO”. For most, Europe included the Balkans and parts of the Mediterranean. But it did not include the Middle East or the Gulf. *Chubin & Green & Larrabee (ibid.)*

³⁸ “To fill partial vacuum, NATO may, over time, extend its gravitational field even further...that does not mean there will ever be, or should be, a global NATO.” *Talbott (ibid.)*

³⁹ “NATO should not become a ‘global alliance,’ but it does need to become capable of acting strongly and wisely in other theaters.” *Kugler (ibid.)*

⁴⁰ “Once unthinkable decisions now appear quite natural. So that NATO Ministers can debate seriously the pros and cons of a more direct Alliance role in Iraq, or even in the Middle East, without storms of theological protest.” *Robertson (ibid.)*

⁴¹ “NATO must no longer remain the regional defense Alliance it used to be. NATO must become a global Alliance, ready to defend its member countries’ interests wherever they are at risk. Global challenges require global security – global security requires a global NATO.” *Mathiopoulos, Margarita (2003), Recommendations for a New Transatlantic Charta, The Potsdam Center for Transatlantic Security and Military Affairs.*

⁴² *Emerson & Tocci (ibid.)*

⁴³ “By redefining its strategic mission in order to expand the scope of its measures for Europe’s defense, NATO policy may stir fears of European colonialism in North Africa and the Middle East.” *Moss (ibid.)*

⁴⁴ “...without some form of international intervention Israelis and Palestinians will continue to die.” *Indyk, Martin (2003), A Trusteeship for Palestine, Foreign Affairs May/June 2003, pp.51-66.*

⁴⁵ “With NATO about to plant its flag in Afghanistan and discussing a possible role in Iraq, some experts have suggested that the Alliance could provide a peacekeeping force in Israel/Palestine if a settlement is eventually reached.” *Monaco, Annalisa (2003), NATO peacekeepers in the Middle East, Annalisi Difesa No.33, CESD NATO Notes, Vol. 5, No. 4, 29 April 2003.*

“The Europeans and the US should prepare plans for a NATO-led peacekeeping force to police a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians ... ‘an international force should take over the occupied territories after an Israeli withdrawal’.” *Evert, Steven (2003), CER Bulletin, Feb-Mar 2003.*

⁴⁶ “The ideal solution would be some sort of United Nations presence or NATO presence.” *Salam al-Marayati, executive director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council in the United States according to Weisman; Weisman, Steven B. (2003) Envoys Hopefully Hit Road on Behalf of Imperiled Map The New York Times , 13 June 2003.*

⁴⁷ “Troops (should be) neither peacekeepers nor monitors.” *Indyk (ibid.)*

⁴⁸ “An Atlantic strategy toward the Middle East can get a boost if the United States and European allies redefine NATO’s strategic purpose—namely, to protect common interests wherever threatened, not just on European soil. This definition could mean the projection of U.S.-European military power to defend world energy supplies and to thwart weapons of mass destruction.” *Gompert, David C. & Green, Jerrold & Larrabee, F. Stephen (1999), Common Interests, Common Responsibilities, How an Atlantic Partnership Could Stabilize the Middle East, RAND Review, Spring 1999 Vol. 23, No. 1.*

⁴⁹ “In contrast to the Middle East, where the U.S. was reluctant to see European involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the Gulf the U.S. welcomed European participation.” *Chubin & Green & Larrabee (ibid.)*

⁵⁰ “NATO faces severe institutional limitations on a formal role in Gulf defense, reflecting widespread apprehension on the part of European governments and publics about becoming entangled in security commitments and military operations outside Europe. NATO as an alliance will continue to have a strong aversion to any serious military role in the Persian Gulf.” *Sokolsky, Richard & Johnson, Stuart & Larrabee, F. Stephen (2001), Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions, RAND, 2001.*

⁵¹ “The path is open for NATO and the UN to play a constructive role in Iraq.” *Caplan, Greg (2003), A Transatlantic Approach to the Middle East Conflict: Do We Have Enough in Common? AICGS/DAAD Working Paper Series, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington.*

⁵² “Should NATO remain primarily a military alliance, focusing on facilitating joint military operations to address military threats? Or should it expand its role to include political challenges such as fostering democracy and market economics, and meeting challenges to security (such as terrorism, drug-trafficking and WMD proliferation) that do not rely primarily on the use of military force?” *Steinberg (ibid.)*

⁵³ “NATO has experience with peacekeeping and disarmament, an available pool of troops, existing command arrangements and a proven track record of promoting defense reform and civil-military relations in former authoritarian states. There would be many advantages to giving NATO a key role in postwar Iraq.” *Gordon (ibid.)*

⁵⁴ *Monaco* quotes anonymous NATO official: “NATO as a peacekeeping force in the Middle East would not be an impossible outcome provided an agreement is reached and if the two parties require it... under a UN mandate NATO would be the ideal institution to do the job, given the presence of both the US and the Europeans.” *Monaco (ibid.)*

⁵⁵ “A diminished reliance on NATO as an institution, particularly in dealing with global security challenges, would push the United States more and more toward the strategy of ‘coalitions of the willing’, diminishing Europe’s influence and enhancing the chances that the United States and Europe would take divergent approaches, to the detriment of both.” *Steinberg (ibid.)*

⁵⁶ “If [U.S.] administration is dismissive of NATO when push comes to shove in Iraq, the alliance might never recover, since NATO must be taken seriously by its strongest member if it is to be taken seriously by anyone... America’s allies (are justified in expecting the U.S. to assemble) a genuine coalition of willing, not just a coalition of obedient.” *Talbot (ibid.)*

⁵⁷ “NATO has a role in a fast-paced global environment. A starting place would be giving NATO commanders broader contingency-planning authority. A bolder concept would be to preauthorize subgroups within NATO to act on behalf of the alliance with regard to potential contingencies.” *Binnendijk, Hans and Binnendijk Anika (2003), Mending NATO: How to save the alliance, International Herald Tribune, May 13, 2003.*

⁵⁸ “Clearly, a shift to ‘majority voting’ in NATO remains out of the question....However, a modification of NATO’s working culture that includes the possibility of setting up flexible coalitions, or that includes the possibility of ‘constructive abstention’ appears not only feasible, but indispensable.” *Röhle (ibid.)*

⁵⁹ *Adams, John Quincy, Independence Day Address, July 4, 1821.*