


NATO
and the
Greater
Middle **East**

Conference Summary – Policy Paper



NATO

and the

Greater

Middle

East

Conference Summary – Policy Paper



Prague Security
Studies Institute

NATO AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

Prague Security Studies Institute
Pohořelec 6, 118 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic
<http://www.pssi.cz/>
pass@pssi.cz

© PSSI 2006
All rights reserved.

Authors: Jiří Schneider, Michael Žantovský, Oldřich Černý, Jan Šnaidauf
Designed by: diverzity & Subrational Industries
Printed by: tiskárna TERCIE Praha

ISBN: 80-903792-2-2

EDITORS' NOTE:

The first annual conference of PSSI's Program of Atlantic Security Studies (PASS) inaugurated the tradition of high-level policy conferences on current geo-strategic issues challenging the Transatlantic partners. Being attended by nearly fifty foreign policy experts, the conference focused on the then widely debated issue of NATO's engagement in the Greater Middle East region. Three years later, this question remains a significant part of the policy discourse on NATO's future partnership and out of area missions. When preparing PSSI's contribution to the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia, it thus seemed natural to us to draw on our past initiative and reprint the summary of key conclusions of the conference. In addition, we decided to include the policy paper, which served as a basis for the conference debates. Our website offers the full version of the original conference proceedings. We will greatly appreciate any feedback or comment via email.

Oldřich Černý

Executive Director, PSSI

CONTENTS

Contents	7
Conference Summary	
<i>Jiří Schneider, Jan Šnidauf</i>	9
PASS Policy Paper: NATO and the GME – a Mission to Renew NATO?	
<i>Jiří Schneider, Michael Žantovský</i>	17
About the Authors	33
Conference Participants	35

CONFERENCE SUMMARY

Jiří Schneider, Jan Šnidauf

The conference was greeted by *Craig Stapleton*, Ambassador of the United States to the Czech Republic, and commenced by *Pavel Bém*, Lord Mayor of Prague. In his opening contribution *HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal* described the contemporary developments in the Middle East, as they appear from the local perspective. He urgently called for the establishment of a strong regional organization with similar characteristics to the European OSCE.

In the course of the conference, several further contributions by distinguished personalities were made outside of the main framework of panel discussions. *Václav Havel* and *Adam Michnik* (the latter in a written contribution) addressed the participants with a colloquium reflecting the experiences with democracy building in Eastern Europe and advocated a regional approach to problem resolution while maintaining multi-polarity. At the gala dinner *Cyril Svoboda* greeted the conference and expressed a strong determination to help advance settlement in the problem areas of GME. *Madeleine Albright* subsequently presented her views and first-hand experience with the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the Clinton administration as well as at present. During the closing luncheon the participants were addressed by Ambassador *R. Nicholas Burns* who delivered the official views of the US administration on issues concerning NATO's role in the Greater Middle East.

As a basis for the conference discussions a policy paper "NATO and the Greater Middle East – a Mission to Renew NATO?" was drafted by *Jiří Schneider* and

Michael Žantovský. The conference was intended to approach the problem area from three different points of view, i.e. that of challenges (strategic view), that of responses (operational view) and that of consequences and implications. Three panels were therefore envisaged, respectively.

PANEL I – The Role of NATO in Fighting Non-traditional Security Threats in the Greater Middle East

The first panel was launched by *Uzi Arad*, who debated whether NATO's function should be newly defined. He argued that the Alliance should preserve its focus on the European theater and not go global, stressing also the necessity to maintain proximity to NATO's original intent, i.e. security threats in contrast with political problems. Within the field of new security threats Arad further differentiated two sets of problems, one being counter-terrorism and the other counter-proliferation. The latter is, he said, ideally suited for alliances, where pooling the resources and sharing the burden is possible. As for the former, Arad suggested that Israel be a 'fellow traveler' and thus a natural partner for NATO which should view it as an asset and enter with Israel a kind of 'discreet alliance'.

Thérèse Delpech then pursued a comprehensive assessment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in the Middle East while referring to the broad spectrum of possible policy responses, whether defensive or preventive. According to her, on both proliferation and terrorism tracks, transatlantic cooperation is improving subsequently. She also mentioned the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as well as the bilateral ties between the U.S. and European countries and cooperation within the framework of the EuroPol and EuroJust agencies. Finally Delpech stated that in contrast to North Eastern Asia where there might be a doubt about the region's relevance to Europe, there is no such question in the case of the Middle East since any WMD use in the area would 'affect us all'. She also referred to the Prague NATO Summit's decision on WMD.

Jeffrey Gedmin addressed the "software" aspects of NATO's engagement, i.e. the political issues that would have been inconceivable in relation to the Alliance

only a few years ago. He drew the attention to the fact that a gap in threat assessment on both sides of the Atlantic continues to present a major obstacle and requires Europe to realize that its 'strategic vacation' is over. The major changes in the strategic environment brought about by the Cold War ending in 1989 and the 9/11 events also contributed to a certain ambivalence as became manifest for instance at various conferences held after the Kosovo war, where European and American perceptions differed. Gedmin then raised a crucial question concerning the farthest limits of disagreement within NATO, which, if overstepped, would imply the Alliance's inability to act effectively.

Subsequently, *Karel Kovanda* pointed out that Afghanistan gave a new meaning to the 'out of area' concept. However, political limitations should still lead to the conclusion that e.g. NATO should not engage in North Korea. Turning to the question of transforming the Alliance into a 'toolbox' instrument, he indicated that the idea can be acceptable if understood as a way of supporting operations like the ones in Macedonia or in the Polish sector of Iraq. Generally Kovanda finds double danger for NATO, one being the impossibility to meet the expectations, thus feeding doubts about NATO's usefulness, and the other one a possible failure in action. Furthermore, three points are vital for NATO's future: a full use of Mediterranean Dialogue, which is to be more than a discussion without any value added; finding a point of equilibrium for the Alliance; and a serious doctrinal debate over the concept of pre-emption, which so far has not taken place within NATO.

As the last panelist, *Onur Öymen* referred to some of the major Middle-Eastern problem characteristics such as the big number of displaced persons or victims of conflicts, lack of democracy and the high percentage of terrorist attacks in the region compared to the world's total. He then described the problems in the political area and called for the establishment of a NATO-EU commission on terrorism where the issue could be treated in the same way as in the NATO-Russia Commission (NRC). Öymen expressed his trust in the Alliance's capabilities to combat terrorism and underlined the necessity to fight it everywhere and without discrimination. Nevertheless he finally warned that not every country of the Greater Middle East would welcome NATO's stronger engagement in the region.

The ensuing discussion revealed several other problems. One participant voiced a doubt concerning the definition of the enemy: terrorism and WMD are merely tools, he said, while the enemy should be rather the Islamist totalitarianism.

Then the question was raised whether the U.S. is prepared to share with Europe its sensitive technologies to close the vast technological gaps. Reference was also made to historical experiences with the Baghdad Pact and CENTO and calls were made for the establishment of a Middle-Eastern Conference for Security and Cooperation (CSC-ME), for a GME-specific humanitarian Marshall plan based on human dignity and for a regional conflict analysis center. In discussing the radical Islamist groups, three of their strategies were pointed out: bin Laden's concept of global struggle reaching its peaks, a search for a new safe haven after Afghanistan and the idea of a non-territorial Islamic ummah. A warning against preemptive attacks was also expressed, since these might be used as precedents by other countries. Finally, the claim was repeated that NATO is running the risk of losing its concentration on real threats and might dilute into other, i.e. non-security, areas.

Before the opening of the second panel, *Bruce Jackson* drew the attention of the conference participants to the contemporary geopolitical visions of the European and Middle-Eastern arenas. In his special presentation "The Frontiers of Freedom and the Middle East" he indicated several problem areas to be responded to in NATO's post-Prague agenda.

PANEL II – The Role of NATO in Peace-Management Operations in the GME

Günther Altenburg's speech launched the second panel. He spoke about the GME and its specific problem attributes, warning against a possible overstretch in the region that NATO might not be able to cope with. Altenburg further identified several points, which are crucial for NATO's future: the need to make the Afghanistan operation a success, including the option for expanding ISAF's mandate throughout the country. Next, the prospective of the Mediterranean dialogue should be clarified. Importantly, the EU-NATO relationship will require a new transatlantic consensus, he said.

Subsequently *Ron Asmus* took the floor turning to the Middle East in terms of its significance as ascribed to the region by the United States. Nowadays the source of conflicts is no longer Europe but the GME, which has turned to be the place where American soldiers are most likely to be killed, he

explained, concluding that Middle-Eastern threats apply generally more to Americans than Europeans. Asmus also acknowledged the need for a strong political statement in order to recognize the Alliance's role, referring in that context to the forthcoming NATO summit in Istanbul. He then speculated about the feasibility of a long-term goal of the GME's political transformation into a different set of societies and asked whether it would be preferable to find a comprehensive solution or rather adopt a crisis-by-crisis approach.

Marc Perrin de Brichambaut then made what he called a 'spectral analysis' of NATO's role, which is increasingly important in regard to all the challenges of the Greater Middle East. He spoke in particular about the Iranian threat, which will force Europe to be concerned with missile defense as it already has been in the case of Russia. He further reflected the general significance that oil reserves as well as relations with Israel have for the development in the GME area. Using a historical parallel, Brichambaut went back to the Suez Crisis of 1956 and to whether there are lessons to be learned from it nowadays. He finally stressed the soft-power aspect of European activities and the experience gained through physical contact with immigrant minorities, which might give Europe good preconditions for activity in the GME.

Ze'ev Schiff started his contribution to the debate by contemplating over the currently unclear borderlines of the Greater Middle East. He expressed his support of the view that instability within the GME would directly endanger the territory of Europe. On the other hand, he argued against perceiving the threats as a territorial problem and called for a definition of NATO's role *vis-à-vis* threats of a global scope. As for the facets of international involvement in peace-management operations, Schiff referred to the Israeli experience with different international formations sent to the country during its history. From that point, he derived three basic principles, which are of vital importance for such operations to be successful: there must be a consent of all parties concerned, there must not be too many parties to negotiate with and there must always be outside assistance.

Petr Mareš concluded the panel. He asked the key question whether there is a role for NATO in the Greater Middle East other than a purely defensive one and found a positive answer resulting from the primacy of the Alliance in terms of its experiences, its power and past successes. Thus NATO should play a stabilizing role but it is uncertain whether it is prepared to do so. Nor is it clear whether the Alliance wants at all to assume such responsibility and since the

institution itself is not used for decision-making, the question remains open. To avoid a certain failure, though, there must be an explicit determination on behalf of NATO's member states to engage in this type of operations.

In the following discussion, the issue of non-military security function by NATO was addressed, aiming at the process of social and political transformation in the GME countries. Also the absence of NATO's capacity to generate integrated intelligence was underlined as well as the gap between European satisfaction with the contemporary status quo and the American determination to achieve a change. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the approaches to Eastern Europe and the Middle East was demonstrated by the Alliance's will to change governance as related to the former, while this was not true regarding the latter. Only after 9/11 was it realized that dealing with terrorism by military means is questionable and the need for bringing back the political agenda was acknowledged. Other questions were concerned with defining the conditions allowing the use of NATO's military force and the concept of the Alliance as a legitimizing element was voiced. Finally attempts were made at assessing the balance between hard and soft power, both needed in the GME to achieve success.

PANEL III – The Role of NATO in Democracy Building in the GME

The conference's third and last panel was opened with a brief contemplation of the general questions of democracy by *Michael Žantovský*. Speaking as the panel's moderator, he raised the question of the universal nature of democracy as well as of its general transportability among diverse environments. Besides that, Žantovský warned against excessive haste in democracy-building, and pointed out NATO's indirect democratizing influence in a number of countries over the years.

Ariel Cohen as the first panelist drew the participants' attention to the war on terrorism that he designated as "fighting for hearts and minds". He then mentioned the unique role that dissidents play in a transforming society, including Muslim societies like Iran, where a dissident class assists the contemporary social process that might bring an end to the current anti-western ideology, which is feeding terrorism. He then identified several Islamic groupings, which

allow for recruitment of terrorists and proceeded further to the sources of their funding that he said come either from the Gulf region or from Muslim diaspora in the West. He also pointed to the roots of terrorism emerging through fundamentalist religious education.

The next speaker, *Olivier Roy* started his contribution by indicating three profound problematic areas of the Greater Middle East: nationalism, social fabric and Islam. Democracy itself, he said, is welcomed in the Muslim world as well, the question being only how to root it and make people work for it. Nationalism is according to Roy the actual driving force in the Middle East interacting with the specific social fabric of local societies. Thus for instance, although Iraq was a nationalist dictatorship, it was not totalitarian, since limited political space and freedoms were available. As for political Islam, Roy insisted that it is no longer a real challenge in the Middle East but rather outside of the region. He advocated a policy of inclusion of all parts of society whether they are really democratic or not. Democracy does not require everyone being an a priori democrat, but should be gradually rooted into society's fabric by addressing specific human concerns.

Joshua Muravchik went on by designating democratization as the centerpiece of US strategy in the war on terrorism, not only in military terms but also in relation to its very roots such as poverty. The poisoned political culture in the Greater Middle East requires a 'bomb of democracy', since there are democrats, who have that need and deserve our help. This would be a job for the Atlantic community, although it does not fit NATO's traditional definition. Muravchik also referred to the recent Arab Human Development Report, where major democracy deficits are listed. In response to many being skeptical about democracy in the Arab world, he drew a parallel with Japan's situation after World War II, where similar doubts used to be voiced.

Asking whether the USA and Europe are capable of creating a joint strategy for promoting democracy in the Middle East, *Steven Everts* commenced his reasoning over the issue, answering immediately: yes they have to, but the key question is how. He continued by pointing to the therapeutic value of the search for common strategy, but reminded of obstacles on both sides: while Europe struggles with its ambivalent attitude towards assuming the leadership role in the region, America cannot sidetrack its massive image problem in spite of the far greater emphasis on democracy as a strategic goal. Concerning the Western interference in GME issues, Everts gave several policy recommendations including seeing the politics

as a vehicle of change, targeting programs to the NGO sector, supporting democratic processes instead of individuals, using institutional anchors, avoiding temptation to 'divisions of labor', patronizing attitudes and gimmicks.

Amin Tarzi subsequently briefed on the current developments in Afghanistan, denying that Islamic radical terrorism is a tangible enemy for NATO to fight. He called for a clear roadmap for Afghanistan that would set up the democracy-building process.

During the closing discussion a number of so far untreated issues were addressed. The stimulant question "whether a democracy may be built while the house is burning" evoked the proposition that extinguishing the fire in the house would be exactly the task for NATO. Furthermore, while it was indicated that democracies do not sponsor terrorism, a counter-affirmation was voiced that even some secular democracies do breed terrorism. And even more so in the countries where religion and state coincide and cannot be mutually separated since there is no official religious body that could be a partner for the state. The proposition was made of the necessity to combine support for reforms within a country (i.e. for its dissidents) with a care about the environment (i.e. the pressure on states) in order to make our intention indubitable. The Middle Eastern situation was also compared to democratization of Latin America, pointing to the lessons learned there.

According to one participant, the Arab liberal experiment was murdered in the 1930s and it is now time to pave the way for democratization by defeating the current enemy, i.e. Islamism, by means of NATO. The view was further strengthened through designating attempts at integration/inclusion of Islamist movements as dangerous experiments that proved to be successful only in Turkey. The economic dimension of democratization was addressed in the course of the debate as well as the goal to create a civil society. Doubts were expressed that a democratic Iran would not pursue the nuclear option. It was pointed out that delegitimizing terrorism should ideally occur by using the concepts of Islam itself. Finally, it was explained that introducing democracy to the Middle East will inevitably bring along Islamic parties that should not, however, present a problem by themselves, in contrast to the pursuit for monopolization of Islam on the part of radical movements.

NATO AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST – A MISSION TO RENEW NATO?

PASS Policy Paper

Jiří Schneider and Michael Žantovský

Summary

The key challenge for NATO in the 1990s was whether to accept the call for “out of area” missions. Since Bosnia and Kosovo this has no longer been a question. After 9/11/2001, the main question remains whether – in the context of fighting international terrorism – NATO should “go global,” and if so, what should be the rationale, the scope and the goal of such a mission.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that **powerful rational arguments for a mission of NATO in the Greater Middle East do exist.**¹ At the very least, the idea deserves an honest and thorough discussion among the Allies.

The main rationale for NATO’s engagement in the Greater Middle East lies in the very nature of threats emanating from the region – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), poor or irresponsible governance (failed or rogue states), often with virulent anti-American and anti-western rhetoric as the sole coherent policy, as well as local conflicts with global repercussions. Allies should take up the gauntlet and make an effort to design not only a common strategy but also to agree on joint measures

within NATO itself. A failure of the U.S. and Europe to face up to these challenges would be detrimental to security on both sides of the Atlantic.

The following seem to be the possible scenarios and their consequences:

1. Both for the U.S. and the EU, it is a policy option **to bypass NATO**² in pursuing their security goals. However, it would be equal to giving up on the political potential of the Alliance. Therefore it is *the least desired option, especially for new NATO members* since it would devalue their hard-won membership, and consequently relegate NATO into oblivion.
2. To turn NATO into a common **toolbox**³ that is to be used either by the U.S. – in building coalitions of the willing – or by the EU – in providing muscles for CESDP ambitions – seems to be a tempting “middle-way” option for some. However, it would put a constant pressure on NATO’s cohesion.⁴ Sooner rather than later, we might find that many of the tools in the box are broken, or even worse, that the toolbox is empty.
3. If enough political will is present, NATO could serve as a proven framework for building a coherent strategy and providing joint or at least common capabilities. In this case, NATO would maintain an independent ability to project power in order to protect the interests of its members in **NATO-led “out of area” operations**. We tend to view this option as an imperative task for the Alliance. However, we could *be risking possible overstretch*.⁵

At this moment, different policy approaches obviously prevail on the two sides of the Atlantic: the U.S. tends to rely on ad hoc coalitions (or multilateralism *à la carte*) rather than on the Alliance, whereas some Europeans view this as unbounded U.S. unilateralism that should be countered. It is NATO that can bridge this potential transatlantic rift – the U.S. should perceive NATO as a formalized ‘coalition of the willing’ and Europeans should use NATO as a primary multilateral venue for cooperation with the U.S. It seems to be clear that using NATO is advantageous both for the U.S.⁶ and European⁷ NATO members.

Introduction – NATO after Iraq

The fact that the Iraqi operation was conducted by a ‘coalition of the willing’, outside of NATO structures, is often interpreted as a failure of NATO.⁸ Others, e. g. Richard Lugar, vehemently oppose this view.⁹

NATO Secretary General Robertson has recently addressed the key question¹⁰ – why should NATO be involved in stabilizing Iraq? Other analysts¹¹ have concluded that Iraq created another political challenge for NATO members. As a matter of fact, difficulties in postwar management in Iraq have led the U.S. to seek broader support materialized in military contributions¹² and providing greater political legitimacy.¹³ In principle, few U.S. policy-makers would like to see the U.S. as a lonely global policeman¹⁴ supported by various ad hoc coalitions.

So far, the role of NATO in Iraq has been limited.¹⁵ NATO's involvement in postwar Iraq extends only to provide logistical support to the Polish-led division of the multinational stabilization force. Nevertheless, NATO has always been dealing with current principal threats, as has been recently manifested in its taking over peace operations in Afghanistan. It is no wonder that a discussion about the future of NATO's role in Iraq and the Greater Middle East is looming.¹⁶

NATO in the Greater Middle East – Key Questions

This paper addresses the topic from the following angles: the nature of new security threats, NATO's capacity to cope with them, the "out of area" concept and its geographical and resource limitations, the possible role for NATO in Iraq or in the Middle East peace process based on NATO's niche capabilities, potential political implications of NATO's Middle Eastern engagement, and, finally, the possible "democratizing" effect of NATO's involvement.

1. TERRITORIAL CORRELATIONS / CONTEXT OF NEW SECURITY THREATS – TERRORISM, PROLIFERATION, FAILED AND ROGUE STATES

The end of the Cold War changed the very substance of European security. Territorial defense against a massive military conflagration in Europe ceased to be the main concern of the Alliance. Wars in the Balkans and accelerated trends toward autonomous European security capabilities forced a drastic change in the security policies of NATO.

After Kosovo new threats emerged into prominence. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, concern about

failed or rogue states (non-cooperating states or states of concern, non-state actors, etc.) – these threats seem to dominate any post 9/11 analysis of the international security environment. As a consequence, the geopolitical focus moved beyond Europe,¹⁷ or at least to its periphery. The emphasis has shifted from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty towards dealing with non-traditional threats.¹⁸ Inevitably, this has raised concerns of some NATO members – both old¹⁹ and new – fearing that the exclusive club is losing its prestige by diluting its commitments.²⁰

The Greater Middle East²¹ (GME) seems to be a conundrum of the above-mentioned threats in the potentially most explosive combination.²² Moreover, GME is the region where both America and Europe share fundamental interests,²³ although – due to various differences – they do not necessarily agree on the policies to pursue these interests. However, there is a powerful incentive to come to an agreement since “neither the U.S. nor Europe can fix the Greater Middle East by itself.”²⁴ In any case, “NATO’s ability to deal with new threats faces an early test in the Middle East.”²⁵

2. HOW CAN NATO REACT? WHAT CAN THE ENLARGED NATO OFFER IN DEALING WITH NEW SECURITY THREATS?

The concept of collective defense (Article 5) has not outlived its relevance. Solidarity among liberal democratic states in defending common values and interests remains vital for the future of democracy. NATO has to maintain its core functions even as it is advancing new ones.²⁶ The nature of the new threats deserves an appropriate response: “To combat transnational terrorist networks effectively, NATO should more closely resemble a network itself.”²⁷

The conceptual answer to the new challenges is territorial enlargement, although this has been motivated also by other factors, and functional extension²⁷ or expansion.²⁸ Any future enlargement of NATO remains geographically confined to the Euro-Atlantic area. However, if NATO is to assume a global role, it cannot do so without closely cooperating with non-European allies (e.g. Australia). In principle, NATO should keep the door open to all eligible allies³⁰ (e.g. Israel). Any functional expansion requires intra-alliance consensus – the current position of NATO is reflected in the Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999.

2.1 The Shift From Military to Non-Military Roles ('Nation Building')

The new security environment is often characterized by the growing relevance of non-military³¹ and non-state factors. Some analysts argue that NATO and the EU should divide labor as if the non-military tasks were solely the EU's business,³¹ whereas others think that NATO is also capable of nation building tasks.³³ NATO's contribution to the democratic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as to similar transitions in some of the older member states – e. g. in cultivating civilian control of armed forces – cannot be denied. This might be of utmost importance in societies where the military serves as a backbone.

The question arises whether the EU is better equipped for the so-called soft security tasks or whether it is simply making a virtue of its inability to deal with the hard ones. It is unclear why European NATO members should be ready to offer more capabilities under the EU flag than they are offering as a part of the Alliance.

In this context, it is important to argue that NATO rather than the U.S. – EU format should remain the main framework of transatlantic security cooperation. It is obvious that NATO provided the necessary political element in containing the Soviet military threat. Coping with the current threats again requires the kind of political legitimacy that can best be secured through NATO.

On a deeper level, it could be argued that NATO – as the traditional repository and defender of “western” values: liberal democracy, free market, rule of law – should be the appropriate vehicle for responding to the new non-traditional threats since they seem to be targeted against this very body of values rather than against any single country, specific territory or specific policy.

3. IS NATO'S “OUT OF AREA” CONCEPT APPLICABLE IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST?

The main question considered during the 1990s was whether NATO had to expand and accept new missions beyond defending its own territory. As Richard Lugar argued in the early 1990s “NATO has to go out of area, or out of business.” However, NATO strategic and conceptual documents (Rome Declaration of 1991 or Madrid Declaration of 1997) kept referring to European or transatlantic security. The Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999 reflected the growing awareness of the changed global

security environment.³⁴ Terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 showed how urgent the question about the place of NATO in the global security system really was.

3.1 Should NATO 'Go Global'?

No consensus on this question has been achieved.³⁵ The debate about the global role of NATO has on the one hand revealed a growing awareness of global challenges,³⁶ inhibited on the other hand by fears of overextending NATO's obligations³⁷. Talbott³⁸ and Kugler³⁹ tried to formulate a balanced view by rejecting global ambitions of NATO. In recent years, opinions among NATO members have shifted significantly: even NATO's Secretary General suggested that the once unthinkable is no longer taboo.⁴⁰ After 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq, one may witness a new dynamism of this debate and some go even further by calling unreservedly for a global NATO.⁴¹

3.2 The Greater Middle East as a Key Global Challenge?

As we mentioned earlier, the Greater Middle East is the most prominent source of mutually correlated threats at the intersection of vital interests. Not incidentally, the region is referred to as the Rubik Cube.⁴² Emerson and Tocci identified four main interrelated crises in the GME – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, threats of Al-Qaeda, the crisis over Iraq and the overall development of the region, or rather the lack thereof. However, due to their preferences for the UN, the US and the EU engagement, the authors have assumed only a minor role for NATO in the region. Others suggest that any engagement of former European colonial powers in the region may raise old fears and resentments.⁴³

3.2.1 NATO and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been traditionally viewed as the very source of Middle Eastern instability. In the past, one might have come to the conclusion that without solving this conflict one cannot envisage stability in the Middle East. At the same time, before the occupation of Iraq one could not realistically expect a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (many Israelis still think that conflict management is the best possible outcome). Rolling back Iraq changed the strategic map of the whole Middle East and paved the way for the Road Map – a new attempt to move the Israeli-Palestinian track forward. In fact, the Pandora box of GME has been opened in a different way than expected.

The truth is that without international engagement the Israeli-Palestinian relations are likely to deteriorate even further.⁴⁴ The idea of international monitoring of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement is supported from various policy perspectives:

1. NATO peacekeeping role after the settlement⁴⁵
2. UN or NATO presence as crisis management⁴⁶
3. U.S.-led trusteeship⁴⁷

Any international presence would be highly sensitive for Israel and it is perceived with caution in Washington, too. On the other hand, Palestinians consistently call for international involvement as a counterweight to Israel. So far, Europeans have preferred to be involved in the Quartet format (US, EU, Russia, UN) as the EU rather than going through NATO. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that at a certain stage of future settlement NATO – alone or in concert with others – might contribute politically rather than militarily on the ground.

There is also a defensive rationale for channeling any western involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through NATO. A dual-track (US, EU) or a multiple-track approach (US, EU, UN, and Russia) might in the course of time transform the so far differing perspectives into conflicting ones, with disastrous consequences both for the Atlantic cohesion and for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself.

3.2.2 NATO and the Gulf – Iraq

The Persian Gulf is of primary concern to NATO allies because of two reasons: proliferation of WMD and securing energy supplies.⁴⁸ It seems that Americans are more aware of the coincidence of NATO member countries' interests in the Gulf and see deeper European engagement as desirable.⁴⁹ It is the European reluctance that stands in the way of more allied cooperation in the Gulf.⁵⁰ As was shown in the Iraqi case, some Europeans do not subscribe to the U.S. policies in the Gulf. Nevertheless, in the current circumstances the way for NATO to the Gulf leads through Iraq.⁵¹

4. POTENTIAL ROLE FOR NATO AND ITS TOOLS

The key question is whether there are any niche capabilities that neither the EU nor the US alone can provide. What may be the unique contributions of NATO in the GME? Are they primarily in the military or in the political areas?⁵²

NATO can provide political legitimacy to stabilization and democratization in the GME. Nevertheless, there will always be a tendency toward using selective formats (e.g. Quartet, Contact Group, etc).

There is the remarkable military record of NATO in planning and running peacekeeping operations including post-conflict stabilization and reforming security structures.⁵³ Suggestions have been made to use this expertise in the GME.⁵⁴

It is a matter of further discussion whether NATO is capable of providing assistance in nation building and promotion of democracy. Here again, Iraq is a test case.

In the 1990s NATO has developed a spectrum of tools to deal with the external challenges it has faced: enlarged cooperation forums (NACC, EAPC), NATO+1 dialogue (NRC, NUC, Mediterranean Dialogue), partnership programs (PfP) and even procedures for future membership (MAP). Patterns of dialogue and cooperation, of sharing best practices and standards, and of providing assistance are firmly rooted in the NATO culture. Possible ways of using some of the existing models in the GME region should be considered. NATO should offer a modified PfP program to some of the countries in the region. Whether this may include even a long-term perspective of membership remains to be discussed. The weak point in applying the above-mentioned formats – which were designed for Europe – in the GME is the following: what kind of sufficient incentives – apart from the membership perspective – can NATO offer in reforming the security system in the GME? Security consultations or partnerships not involving full membership do not seem sufficient, especially for some of the smaller democratic or democratizing countries of the region. The problem is that the “added value” of a NATO security involvement as opposed to a US security guarantee is at the moment not very high. That, however, can and should change in the course of time.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE NATO ENGAGEMENT IN THE GME (IRAQ, PALESTINE) – CEMENTING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS OR DESTROYING NATO’S COHESION?

NATO could obviously neglect global aspirations in its further development. The consequence would be the loss of global significance.⁵⁵ All depends on policies of member states. The most poignant expression of this fact comes from the U.S.⁵⁶ If NATO takes up global challenges – initially in the GME region

- it would be a serious test of its interoperability and cohesion. It would have inevitable implications for planning⁵⁷ and decision-making procedures⁵⁸ within the Alliance, which present some member states with an undoubtedly sensitive dilemma. Authorization of planning procedures and weakening of the principle of unanimity are definitely explosive subjects for political discussions within NATO. However, the alternatives seem to be even worse. The risk of bypassing or marginalizing NATO is evident. Deepening of the Atlantic rift over NATO would be detrimental to both its shores. There is a way out – the U.S. should perceive NATO as a formalized ‘coalition of the willing’ and Europeans should use NATO as a primary multilateral venue for cooperation with the U.S. Thus NATO will be able to deal with the most urgent current crises starting with the Greater Middle East.

To search for a global role for NATO just so that it has some kind of a role would be both wrong and destined to fail. A freedom-loving alliance, just like a freedom-loving country, should not seek adventures abroad, “in search of monsters to slay.”⁵⁹ However, in the case of GME, the monsters are already very much there. To address their threats is thus not a question of expanding or transforming NATO’s mission but rather a question of the continued vitality of its original mission and purpose.

Endnotes and Bibliography

- ¹ By the Greater Middle East we understand the region from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf – sometimes also called “wider Middle East” = Maghreb + Mashreq + the Gulf – see Emerson, Michael & Tocci, Nathalie (2003), *The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East* CEPS, Brussels.
- ² “NATO might be sidelined by ad hoc coalitions of states more able and perhaps even more willing than the old NATO fogies.” Rühle, Michael (2003), *NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11*, Parameters, Summer 2003, pp. 89-97.
- ³ “In extra-European contingencies NATO is just one operation framework among many...serving as a toolbox (military service center) for extra-European operations...no a priori geographical limits.” Bertram, Christoph (2002), *Paper for Discussion on 15th Review Conference on the Future Task of Alliance*, Berlin, September 25, 2002.

- ⁴ “The time may have come to look at how a toolbox approach can be reconciled with the continuing need for political cohesion.” Rühle (ibid.)
- ⁵ “NATO may not survive as a general contractor for the pan-Eurasian renovation project.” Talbott, Strobe (2002): From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk, Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 2002, pp. 46–57.
- ⁶ “Should institutions that the United States belongs to—such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—continue to hold a decisive place in U.S. strategy, or should the United States coordinate more with other institutions, such as the European Union (EU), where it has less influence?” Moss, Kenneth B. (2000), Strategic Choices in the Mediterranean: Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, *Middle East Review of International Affairs* Vol. 4 No. 1/March 2000.
- ⁷ “...by positioning NATO at the hub of European anti-terror efforts, it would provide them /i.e. the Europeans/ with a voice in the planning and implementation of these efforts, as well as bring them in contact with the alliance’s substantial assets and capabilities.” Johnson, Rebecca and Zenko, Micah (2002), All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should Be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror, in: *Parameters*, winter 2002–03, pp. 48–63.
- ⁸ “...to many commentators and not a few policymakers, the Atlantic Alliance is dead...” Kupchan, Charles (2003), The Atlantic Alliance Lies in the Rubble, *Financial Times*, April 10, 2003.
- ⁹ “The political rift over Iraq has given ammunition to those who wrongly believe that NATO has outlived its military purpose.” Lugar, Richard (2003), Nation-Building is a Role for NATO, *Financial Times*, May 29, 2003.
- ¹⁰ “If NATO is the best military framework in the world, can we afford not to use it to help bring stability to post conflict Iraq?” Robertson, George (2003) The West after Iraq: Are the Security Strategies of the US and Europe still Compatible? BMVG-FAZ Forum Berlin, June 24, 2003.
- ¹¹ “The post-Iraqi war era provides an opportunity for NATO to reorient towards the Middle East.” Millen, Raymond A. (2003), Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: Europe, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), March 2003, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/irqeurop/irqeurop.pdf>.
- ¹² “[In Iraq] we want the military burden shared both for military and economic reasons, but also for reasons of political acceptability and legitimacy.” Haass, Richard N. (1998) Iraq What Next? Containing Saddam is the most likely U.S. policy, *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, 1 March 1998, available at www.brookings.org.

- ¹³ "...giving a role to NATO would prove that Iraq was not a mere American protectorate..." Gordon, Philip H. (2003), *An Alliance for Iraq: a NATO role would heal many hurts*, International Herald Tribune, April 15, 2003.
- ¹⁴ "...key NATO members other than the U.S. and the UK would have a greater say in the management of Iraq. This could be to the benefit of the United States which has neither the temperament nor the will to be a permanent hegemon in such an inhospitable region of the world." Kemp, Geoffrey (2003), *Beyond Iraq: Repercussions of Iraq's Stabilization and Reconstruction Policies*, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 12, 2003.
- ¹⁵ "...the alliance has no plans for a greater role in postwar Iraq...NATO is already committed in helping in Iraq, we are not at a stage yet of looking at any broader involvement to Iraq." Robertson (AFP, July, 16, 2003).
- ¹⁶ "If the U.S. and Britain decide that a broader military presence is required, NATO is the natural choice, as has been the case in Afghanistan." Kemp (ibid.)
- ¹⁷ "...the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction ... emerge from outside of Europe... they draw US attention away from Europe, ...away from NATO." Rühle (ibid.)
- ¹⁸ "Make no mistake, modern-day terrorism and WMD proliferation are 'Article 5 threats' in NATO's parlance... the new threats are capable of violating NATO's borders and striking the societies of all its members as well as their military forces... This trend is rapidly making NATO's old distinction between Article 4 and Article 5 obsolete. Kugler, Richard (2002), *Preparing NATO to meet new threats: Challenge and Opportunity*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State Vol. 7 No. 1, March 2002.
- ¹⁹ "Turkey feared that the recent emphasis on "new missions" in the Strategic Concept could lead to a weakening of Article 5 and collective defense." Chubin, Shahram & Green, Jerrold D. & Larrabee, F. Stephen (Rapporteur) (1999), *NATO's New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East Center for Middle East Public Policy*, Geneva Center for Security Policy.
- ²⁰ "The irony of NATO is that is an alliance in search of a purpose, at a time when its biggest member cares less about it, and isn't quite sure what it gets out of it. Moreover, a growing number of NATO's members see it mainly as a status club, but one that with each of their joining becomes even less exclusive." Singer, Peter W. (2003), *New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond*, Weltpolitik, January 15, 2003.

- ²¹ “Some authors refer to the North Africa, Arabia, Israel and Iran as the Wider Middle East Emerson & Tocci (*ibid.*); others call the same region including Afghanistan and Pakistan the Greater Middle East.” Asmus, Ronald D. and Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002), *The New Transatlantic Project*, The Policy Review No.115 October 2002.
- ²² “The nature of the new threat we face... the interweaving of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and failed and rogue states from Marrakech to Bangladesh...the challenge we face is de facto concentrated in one specific geographic region – the Greater Middle East. That region starts with Northern Africa and Egypt and Israel at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and extends throughout the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Asmus (*ibid.*)
- ²³ “In the Middle East, the transatlantic allies share important interests. These include a powerful interest in assuring stable, affordable supplies of energy from the region, and a common stake in the economic and political reforms that are needed to reduce the region’s role as an importer of WMD and an exporter of terror.” Steinberg, James B. (2003) *An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 113–146.
- ²⁴ Asmus (*ibid.*)
- ²⁵ Talbott (*ibid.*)
- ²⁶ “NATO must find a new balance between addressing its traditional, Euro-centric missions and tackling the new global threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.” Rühle (*ibid.*)
- ²⁷ Johnson & Zenko (*ibid.*)
- ²⁸ “The debate over mission has been both functional and geographical.” Steinberg (*ibid.*)
- ²⁹ “The concept is one of NATO expansion, just in functional rather than geographic terms.” Singer (*ibid.*)
- ³⁰ According to the Prague Summit Declaration: “NATO’s door will remain open to European democracies...”
- ³¹ “We need to go on the offensive to address the root causes and not just the symptoms of terrorism... We need to think not only in terms of military preemption but political preemption as well.” Asmus (*ibid.*)
- ³² “NATO should assume the military burden in Iraq, and a partnership of the US and the European Union should assume the non-military burden... The EU has also demonstrated a capacity to deal with non-military tasks of ‘nation-building.’ From every perspective – including the future relevance of NATO and the reforging of links among the world’s powers – engaging NATO and the EU in Iraq makes sense...”

Hunter, Robert (2003), America needs Europe to win peace in Iraq, Financial Times July 20, 2003.

- ³³ “Successful ‘nation-building’ must be an important objective for US policymakers and their NATO partners.” Lugar (ibid.)
- ³⁴ Article 24 of the Strategic Concept declares: “Any armed attack on the territory of the allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources...” NATO, Strategic Concept; Approved by NAC, Washington, Apr 23–24, 1999.
- ³⁵ Prague Summit Declaration uses rather general wording: “... to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come.”
- ³⁶ “Should NATO ‘go global’ in its military dimension, to address out-of-area problems that may have an indirect impact on the security of NATO’s members but do not necessarily represent an Article 5 attack on the members’ territory?” Steinberg (ibid.)
- ³⁷ There was no clear consensus within NATO on how far NATO’s geographic scope should extend. Most European participants at the workshop felt that NATO should remain focused on Europe and its periphery and argued against any effort to develop a “global NATO”. For most, Europe included the Balkans and parts of the Mediterranean. But it did not include the Middle East or the Gulf. Chubin & Green & Larrabee (ibid.)
- ³⁸ “To fill partial vacuum, NATO may, over time, extend its gravitational field even further... that does not mean there will ever be, or should be, a global NATO.” Talbot (ibid.)
- ³⁹ “NATO should not become a ‘global alliance,’ but it does need to become capable of acting strongly and wisely in other theaters.” Kugler (ibid.)
- ⁴⁰ “Once unthinkable decisions now appear quite natural. So that NATO Ministers can debate seriously the pros and cons of a more direct Alliance role in Iraq, or even in the Middle East, without storms of theological protest.” Robertson (ibid.)
- ⁴¹ “NATO must no longer remain the regional defense Alliance it used to be. NATO must become a global Alliance, ready to defend its member countries’ interests wherever they are at risk. Global challenges require global security – global security requires a global NATO.” Mathiopoulos, Margarita (2003), Recommendations for

a New Transatlantic Charta, The Potsdam Center for Transatlantic Security and Military Affairs.

⁴² Emerson & Tocci (ibid.)

⁴³ "By redefining its strategic mission in order to expand the scope of its measures for Europe's defense, NATO policy may stir fears of European colonialism in North Africa and the Middle East." Moss (ibid.)

⁴⁴ "...without some form of international intervention Israelis and Palestinians will continue to die." Indyk, Martin (2003), a Trusteeship for Palestine, Foreign Affairs May/June 2003, pp.51-66.

⁴⁵ "With NATO about to plant its flag in Afghanistan and discussing a possible role in Iraq, some experts have suggested that the Alliance could provide a peacekeeping force in Israel/Palestine if a settlement is eventually reached." Monaco, Annalisa (2003), NATO peacekeepers in the Middle East, Annali Difesa No.33, CESD NATO Notes, Vol. 5, No. 4, 29 April 2003.

"The Europeans and the US should prepare plans for a NATO-led peacekeeping force to police a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians ... 'an international force should take over the occupied territories after an Israeli withdrawal'." Evert, Steven (2003), CER Bulletin, Feb-Mar 2003.

⁴⁶ "The ideal solution would be some sort of United Nations presence or NATO presence." Salam al-Marayati, executive director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council in the United States according to Weisman; Weisman, Steven B. (2003) Envoys Hopefully Hit Road on Behalf of Imperiled Map The New York Times, 13 June 2003.

⁴⁷ "Troops (should be) neither peacekeepers nor monitors." Indyk (ibid.)

⁴⁸ "An Atlantic strategy toward the Middle East can get a boost if the United States and European allies redefine NATO's strategic purpose-namely, to protect common interests wherever threatened, not just on European soil. This definition could mean the projection of U.S.-European military power to defend world energy supplies and to thwart weapons of mass destruction." Gompert, David C. & Green, Jerrold & Larrabee, F. Stephen (1999), Common Interests, Common Responsibilities, How an Atlantic Partnership Could Stabilize the Middle East, RAND Review, Spring 1999 Vol. 23, No. 1.

⁴⁹ "In contrast to the Middle East, where the U.S. was reluctant to see European involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the Gulf the U.S. welcomed European participation." Chubin & Green & Larrabee (ibid.)

⁵⁰ "NATO faces severe institutional limitations on a formal role in Gulf defense, reflecting widespread apprehension on the part of European governments and publics

about becoming entangled in security commitments and military operations outside Europe. NATO as an alliance will continue to have a strong aversion to any serious military role in the Persian Gulf.” Sokolsky, Richard & Johnson, Stuart & Larrabee, F. Stephen (2001), *Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions*, RAND, 2001.

- ⁵¹ “The path is open for NATO and the UN to play a constructive role in Iraq.” Caplan, Greg (2003), *a Transatlantic Approach to the Middle East Conflict: Do We Have Enough in Common?* AICGS/DAAD Working Paper Series, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington.
- ⁵² “Should NATO remain primarily a military alliance, focusing on facilitating joint military operations to address military threats? Or should it expand its role to include political challenges such as fostering democracy and market economics, and meeting challenges to security (such as terrorism, drug-trafficking and WMD proliferation) that do not rely primarily on the use of military force?” Steinberg (ibid.)
- ⁵³ “NATO has experience with peacekeeping and disarmament, an available pool of troops, existing command arrangements and a proven track record of promoting defense reform and civil-military relations in former authoritarian states. There would be many advantages to giving NATO a key role in postwar Iraq.” Gordon (ibid.)
- ⁵⁴ Monaco quotes anonymous NATO official: “NATO as a peacekeeping force in the Middle East would not be an impossible outcome provided an agreement is reached and if the two parties require it... under a UN mandate NATO would be the ideal institution to do the job, given the presence of both the US and the Europeans.” Monaco (ibid.)
- ⁵⁵ “A diminished reliance on NATO as an institution, particularly in dealing with global security challenges, would push the United States more and more toward the strategy of ‘coalitions of the willing’, diminishing Europe’s influence and enhancing the chances that the United States and Europe would take divergent approaches, to the detriment of both.” Steinberg (ibid.)
- ⁵⁶ “If [U.S.] administration is dismissive of NATO when push comes to shove in Iraq, the alliance might never recover, since NATO must be taken seriously by its strongest member if it is to be taken seriously by anyone...America’s allies (are justified in expecting the U.S. to assemble) a genuine coalition of willing, not just a coalition of obedient.” Talbott (ibid.)
- ⁵⁷ “NATO has a role in a fast-paced global environment. A starting place would be giving NATO commanders broader contingency-planning authority. A bolder concept

would be to pre-authorize subgroups within NATO to act on behalf of the alliance with regard to potential contingencies.” Binnendijk, Hans and Binnendijk Anika (2003), *Mending NATO: How to save the alliance*, International Herald Tribune, May 13, 2003.

⁵⁸ “Clearly, a shift to ‘majority voting’ in NATO remains out of the question....However, a modification of NATO’s working culture that includes the possibility of setting up flexible coalitions, or that includes the possibility of “constructive abstention” appears not only feasible, but indispensable.” Rühle (ibid.)

⁵⁹ Adams, John Quincy, Independence Day Address, July 4, 1821.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

OLDŘICH ČERNÝ is Executive Director and co-founder of the Prague Security Studies Institute. Prior to 1989, Oldřich Černý, who holds advanced degrees in both English and Czech, was employed as a translator of foreign literature into Czech and as a producer for the dubbing of foreign films into Czech. In 1990, after working as a director and producer of the New York Festival of Banned Czech Films, Mr. Černý was appointed National Security Advisor to the President of Czechoslovakia. Following the split of Czechoslovakia in January of 1993, Mr. Černý was appointed first Director General of the Czech Foreign Intelligence Service, a post he held until his resignation in 1998. Since 1999, Mr. Černý has served as Executive Director of the Forum 2000 Foundation.

JIRÍ SCHNEIDER is the program director of PSSI and former Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, where he also held the post of head of the Policy Planning Department (1993–1994, 1999–2001, and 2003–2004). In 2002, Mr. Schneider served as an International Policy Fellow at the Open Society Institute in Budapest. From 1995–1998, Mr. Schneider served as the Ambassador of the Czech Republic to Israel. Mr. Schneider is a former MP of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (1990–1992). Prior to 1989 and his entry to public service, Mr. Schneider was employed as a forestry surveyor. He serves as a part-time lecturer at Charles University, New York University in Prague, and to PSSI's Robinson-Martin Security Scholars Program.

MICHEAL ŽANTOVSKÝ is the Czech Ambassador to the State of Israel and the former Coordinator of PASS. In 1996, he was elected to the Czech Senate for a six-year term. During his tenure as Senator, he was elected three times to serve as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security. He was also twice elected to the presidency of his political party, the Civic Democratic Alliance. Between 1992 and 1997, Žantovský served as the first Czechoslovak Ambassador, and later the Czech Ambassador to the United States. From 1990 till 1992, Mr. Žantovský served as Press Secretary and Spokesman for President Václav Havel. As a journalist, translator and writer, he was a founding member of the Civic Forum and a founding member of the Czech chapter of P.E.N.

JAN ŠNAIDAUF heads the Board of the Research Center of the Association for International Affairs (AMO) in Prague. In his research he focuses on the prospects of pro-democratic transformation processes in the Middle East, the life of Muslim minorities in Europe, and the activities of Islamist organizations. Jan Šnidauf also coordinates a project run by the Forum 2000 Foundation in Prague dedicated to Middle Eastern water resources. He was also an intern at the European Parliament, the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Berlin and the Nixon Center in Washington DC. Jan Šnidauf holds an M.A. and a doctoral title in History and Culture of Islamic Lands including Arabic Language, and a B.A. in International Area Studies from Charles University. He is a graduate of the Robinson-Martin Security Scholars Program.

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

(2003 Reprint; positions held in the time of conference)

** PASS Advisory Board Member*

*** PASS Board Member*

GUNDUZ AKTAN

Columnist, Former Director
of the TESEV Institute
Ankara

ISHAK ALATON

Chairman of the Board, Alarko
Holding A. S.
Istanbul

MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT*

President, The Albright Group, LLC.
Washington, DC

ABDULLATIF ALREFAEE

Head of the Department
of International Relations,
Ministry of Defense
Kuwait City

GÜNTHER ALTENBURG

Assistant Secretary General
for Political Affairs
and Security Policy, NATO
Brussels

UZI ARAD

Director, Institute for Policy
and Strategy
Herzlia

RONALD D. ASMUS*

Senior Transatlantic Fellow,
The German Marshall Fund
of the United States
Washington, DC

ARTHUR AVNON

Ambassador of the State of Israel
to the Czech Republic
Prague

PAVEL BÉM

Lord Mayor of the City of Prague
Prague

ANTONÍN BERDYCH**

President, Association
for International Affairs
Prague

MARC PERRIN DE BRICHAMBAUT
Director for Strategic Affairs,
Ministry of Defense
Paris

PETR BROD
Director, BBC Czech Republic
Prague

SHLOMO BROM
Senior Research Associate, The Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies
Tel Aviv

R. NICHOLAS BURNS
U.S. Permanent Representative
to NATO
Brussels

CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL
Senior Editor, The Weekly Standard
Washington, DC

OLDŘICH ČERNÝ**
Director, Prague Security Studies
Institute
Prague

ARIEL COHEN
Research Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation
Washington, DC

ERIKA CSEKES*
Attorney at Law, Csekes, Világi,
Drgonec & Partners
Bratislava

THÉRESE DELPECH
Director, The French Atomic Energy
Commision (CEA), Direction
of Strategic Affairs
Paris

THOMAS DINE
Director, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty
Prague

GABRIEL EICHLER*
CEO, Benson Oak
Prague

STEVEN EVERTS
Senior Research Fellow, Centre
for European Reform
London

HYNEK FAJMON
Member of the Parliament
of the Czech Republic
Prague

EVA FILIPIOVÁ
Director, Middle East and North
Africa Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Czech Republic
Prague

IVAN GABAL
Consultant and Analyst, Gabal
Analysis & Consulting
Prague

JEFFREY GEDMIN*
Director, Aspen Institute Berlin
Berlin

MARCUS GERHARDT

Vice Chairman, Civility Program,
Foreign Policy Centre
London

HIRSH GOODMAN

Senior Research Associate, Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies
Tel Aviv

MARCELA GÜRLICHOVÁ

Advisor to the Prime Minister
of the Czech Republic
Prague

KARL-THEODOR ZU GUTTENBERG

Member of the German Bundestag
Berlin

AHMET K. HAN

Academician and Resident Fellow,
Istanbul Bilgi University, Graduate
School of Social Sciences
Istanbul

HRH PRINCE EL HASSAN BIN TALAL

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Amman

VÁCLAV HAVEL*

Former President of the Czech
Republic
Prague

MARK A. HELLER

Principal Research Associate,
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
Tel Aviv

JÍŘÍ HUML

Deputy Director for Management,
Česká Pojišťovna a.s.
Prague

JANA HYBÁŠKOVÁ

Ambassador of the Czech Republic
to the State of Kuwait
Kuwait City

BRUCE JACKSON

President, Project on Transitional
Democracies
Washington, DC

JOSEF JAŘAB

Member of the Senate of the Czech
Republic,
Chairman, Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs,
Defense and Security
Prague

ROMAN JOCH

Director, Civic Institute
Prague

ELY KARMON

Senior Research Scholar,
International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism
Herzlyia

KAREL KOVANDA

Permanent Representative
of the Czech Republic to NATO
Brussels

DANIEL KUMERMANN

Ambassador of the Czech Republic
to the State of Israel
Tel Aviv

ERAN LERMAN

Director, The American Jewish
Committee,
Middle East Office
Jerusalem

PETR LUŇÁK

Information Officer, Public
Diplomacy Division, NATO
Brussels

PETR MAREŠ

Deputy Prime Minister for Research
and Development, Human Rights
and Human Resources
Prague

WILLIAM F. MARTIN

Senior Advisor to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Chairman
of Washington Policy and Analysis
Washington, DC

MARGARITA MATHIOPOULOS

CEO, European Advisory Group,
Chairman of the FDP National
Committee on Foreign and Security
Policy
Berlin

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK*

Resident Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute
Washington, DC

PETR NEVICKÝ

Chairman of the Board, Ness Czech
Republic
Prague

ONUR ÖYMEN

Member of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly
Ankara

MARTIN PALOUŠ

Ambassador of the Czech Republic
to the U.S.
Washington, DC

JIŘÍ PEHE

Resident Director, New York
University in Prague
Prague

ROUZBEH PIROUZ

Chairman, Civility Project, Foreign
Policy Centre
London

PETR PITHART

President of the Senate of the Czech
Republic
Prague

RUPRECHT POLENZ

Member of the German Bundestag
Berlin

ROGER ROBINSON*

President and CEO, Conflict
Securities Advisory Group, Inc.
Washington, DC

OLIVIER ROY

Research Director, French National
Center for Scientific Research
Paris

BARRY RUBIN

Director, Global Research in
International Affairs Center
Herzliya

JAN RUML

Vice President of the Senate
of the Czech Republic
Prague

JACQUES RUPNIK*

Research Director, Center for
International Studies and Research
Paris

ÖZDEM SANBERK

Former Director of the Turkish
Economic and Social Studies
Foundation
Istanbul

ZE'EV SCHIFF

Editor, Ha'aretz
Tel Aviv

JIRÍ SCHNEIDER**

Director, Policy Planning
Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Czech Republic
Prague

DAN SCHUEFTAN

Senior Fellow, The National Security
Studies Center,
Haifa

KAREL SCHWARZENBERG*

Former Chancellor of the President
of the Czech Republic
Prague

JAROSLAV ŠEDIVÝ

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Czech Republic
Prague

LURIE SPENGLER

Director, Central European Advisory
Group
Prague

WESTON STACEY

Executive Director, American
Chamber of Commerce
Prague

CRAIG R. STAPLETON

Ambassador of the United States
of America to the Czech Republic
Prague

CYRIL SVOBODA

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Czech Republic
Prague

FRANTIŠEK ŠULC

Senior Editor, Lidové noviny
Prague

AMIN TARZI

Editor, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty
Prague

BŘETISLAV TUREČEK

Editor and Publicist, Právo
Prague

LUBOŠ VESELÝ**

Senior Research Fellow,
Association for International Affairs
Prague

TERRENCE VALESKI

General Manager, Eurotel Praha,
spol. s r. o.
Prague

ALEXANDR VONDRA**

Transatlantic Fellow, The German
Marshall Fund of the United States
Prague

JIRÍ WEIGL

Director, Chancellory of President
of the Czech Republic
Prague

MICHAEL ŽANTOVSKÝ**

Coordinator, Program of Atlantic
Security Studies
Prague

JAN ŽIŽKA

Editor, Euro
Prague